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The Impact of Freedom of Information
Legislafion on Criminal Discovery in
Comparative Common Law Perspective
Michael Taggart*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the effect of freedom of information legislation

on criminal discovery in the United States, Canada,Australia, and New
Zealand. While all of these countries share the common law tradition
and have comparablefreedom of information legislation, Professor Taggart notes that the impact of that legislation on the law and practice of
criminal discovery varies in each country.
The United States courts generally have resisted attempts by criminal
defendants to gain access to a wider range of material under the Freedom of Information Act than available by conventional discovery. So far
the courts are unwilling to allow that Act to supplement, and thereby
possibly supercede, the discovery provisions of the FederalRules of Criminal Procedure.
Examination offreedom of information legislationin Canada discloses
little likely impact on the law and practice of criminal discovery. At the
federal level, broad law enforcement exemptions nullify the practicaluse
of the Access to Information Act by criminal defendants. Provincialfreedom of information legislationin Canada either exempts from disclosure
material desired by criminal defendants, does not cover law enforcement
agencies or prosecutorial authorities,or, to date, has not been used for
* Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand. I acknowledge gratefully my debt to the Faculty of Law at Queen's University, Kingston,
whose facilities I enjoyed as a Visiting Scholar while writing this Article.
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criminal discovery.
The language of Australia'sfederal and statefreedom of information
Acts appears to allow scope for criminal discovery-motivated requests by
criminal defendants. Courts and administrative tribunals, however,
have been hostile to freedom of information requests in aid of criminal
discovery.
Criminal defendants seeking broader disclosure than conventional
criminal discovery allows have had much greater success under New
Zealand's Official Information Act. The key New Zealand case interpreting the reach of that Act held that criminal investigations by the police,
before criminal charges are laid, will be protectedfrom disclosure; however, once criminal proceedings are begun, the Act has been interpreted
in favor of disclosure. At this point, the defendant's right to afair trial
has been said to prevail over the interest in investigative secrecy.
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INTRODUCTION

Historically the common law has been hostile to the idea of criminal
discovery, fearing that perjury and witness intimidation would result
from making the defense aware of the prosecution's case in advance of
trial.' The belated recognition that fairness demanded some kind of discovery for the defense produced a limited regime of disclosure based substantially on prosecutorial discretion.2 Attempts to liberalize criminal
1. The arguments for and against pre-trial discovery in the criminal context in the
United States have been canvassed extensively. There are over one hundred articles and
comments on the subject from 1960 to 1973 and a considerable number since then. See 7
U.S.F. L. REV. 369, 388-89 (1973) (bibliography); 5 TULSA L.J. 208-11 (1968)
(bibliography).
2. See, e.g., J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1850 (1976)
(describing the common law rule); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1180-85 (1960).
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discovery further continue to meet resistance throughout the common law
world. Some commentators have looked to freedom of information (FOI)
legislation as a means of transforming the discretionary and variable
conventional practice of criminal discovery into a more liberal regime
based on statutory right.' This Article examines what impact FOI legislation has had on criminal discovery at the federal level in the United
States, the federal and provincial/state levels in Canada and Australia,
and in New Zealand.
This survey will reveal that the idea of broadening criminal discovery
by use of FOI legislation has met judicial resistance in the United States
and to a lesser extent in Australia. In Canada the breadth of law enforcement exemptions virtually rules out criminal discovery-motivated
FOI requests. In contrast, the Court of Appeal in New Zealand has
fashioned a code of pre-trial criminal discovery out of that country's FOI
statute. The varying approaches underline differing judicial postures and
social settings in these four countries that share the common law
tradition.
II.

THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE

The battle for criminal discovery in the United States has been fought
long and hard but is far from over.4 The late development and slow
evolution of a limited code of criminal discovery at the federal level, and
experimentation with broader criminal discovery in several state jurisdictions, typify the United States experience.
At the federal level, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for pretrial discovery of certain information and material
in the possession of the prosecution.5 This rule allows the accused to
inspect and copy any statement made by himself,6 but it does not require

3.

See, e.g., Note, The Freedom of Information Act-A Potential Alternative to

Conventional CriminalDiscovery, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73 (1976) (authored by Jordan, Kehoe & Schechter).

4. See supra note 1.
5. See generally 2 C.A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2d §§ 251261 (1982 & Supp. 1989). Apart from Rule 16, several other rules may be used as
discovery devices on occasion, but all are hedged about by restrictions. See FED. R. CRiM.
P. 6(a)(1)(3) (application may be made by defense for a copy of witness testimony before
the grand jury), 7 (filing of a bill of particulars), 15 (depositions), 17(c) (subpoenas duces
tecum).
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A). Rule 16(a)(1)(B), (C) and (D) provide for discov-

ery of the accused's prior criminal record, and any documents, tangible objects, reports,
and examinations that are in the custody of the prosecution and that are material to the
preparation of the defense or are intended for use as evidence.
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the prosecution to disclose the names and addresses of any prospective
prosecution witnesses;7 nor does it oblige the prosecutor to furnish the
accused with a copy of statements by prospective witnesses." In this last
respect, Rule 16 follows the Jencks Act of 1957," which provides that in
any federal criminal prosecution no statement or report by any government witness or prospective government witness shall be the subject of
discovery until the witness testifies on direct examination at trial. Cutting across this, however, is the due process imperative that the prosecution must disclose all evidence favorable to the accused, provided it is
material to guilt (i.e., creates a reasonable doubt) or punishment."0 Furthermore, the Rules clearly were intended to prescribe the minimum
amount of discovery to which the parties are entitled by law and not to
limit the trial judge's discretion to order broader discovery in appropriate
cases.11 Even so, criminal discovery at the federal level falls well short of
the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, which require the prosecution to provide, upon request, names and addresses of

7. Id. 16(a)(2). In 1974 the United States Supreme Court approved an amendment
to Rule 16 that would have required the government, upon request of the defense, to
furnish the names and addresses of all witnesses the prosecution intended to call at trial.
Congress did not ratify this "most controversial" amendment. H.R. REP. No. 414, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1975) (Conference Committee Notes); 2 C.A. WRIGHT, supra note
5, § 254, at 86, 90 & nn.73-75.
Note that the courts retain a discretion, unaffected by the rules, to order the disclosure
of the names and addresses of witnesses. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 99
(1967); infra note 11. As often as not the courts refuse so to order. See 2 C.A. WRIGHT,
supra note 5, § 254, at nn.76-77 (outlining case law). For a discussion of the protection

given by exemption (7)(0) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 522
(1988), to the names and addresses of persons interviewed by law enforcement officers,
see infra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Tragash, 121 F.R.D. 59 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
9. Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988)).
The Act was named after the Supreme Court decision in Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957), in which the court held that reports by prosecution witnesses had to be
handed over to the defense at trial. Congress moved to codify that position and to contain
the scope of the decision when lower courts began to apply Jencks to compel pre-trial
discovery. See Note, The Aftermath of the Jencks Case, 11 STAN. L. REV. 297 (1959);
Note, TheJencks Legislation: Problems in Prospect,67 YALE L.J. 674 (1958); Palermo
v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
10. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (the Brady doctrine); United States
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
11. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 255, 231 (1975); United States v.
Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 857 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Hewitt & Bell, Beyond
Rule 16: The Inherent Power of the Federal Court to Order Pretrial Discovery in
Criminal Cases, 7 U.S.F. L. REv. 233 (1973).
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witnesses, together with any relevant witness statements.1 2
The experience with criminal discovery at the state level varies a great
deal. States such as California"3 have demonstrated that broad criminal
discovery regimes do not open a Pandora's Box and have encouraged
other states to follow suit. A significant number of states, however, remain aligned with the federal stance on criminal discovery. 4
In response to the restrictive and somewhat complex federal criminal
discovery regime,m and the diversity of state criminal discovery practice,
defense counsel have sought to use the federal Freedom of Information
Act"" (FOIA) and state open record laws as substitutes for or aids to
criminal discovery. This Article focuses on discovery-motivated uses of

the FOIA.
FOIA access supposedly has a number of advantages over conventional criminal discovery." First of all, whereas a potential defendant
cannot seek discovery before charges are laid or after the time provided
for by court rule, the defendant can make an FOIA request before
charges are brought (i.e., during investigation), during the conventional
discovery period, or after that period expires. 9 Second, in theory, the
strictly limited response times under the FOIA compare favorably with

12. 2 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 11, §
2.1(a)(i) (Supp. 1986). The American Bar Association promulgated standards for criminal discovery as early as 1970 and has revised them since. See generally Norton, Criminal Discovery: Experience Under the American Bar Association Standards, 11 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 661 (1980).
13. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L.
REV. 56 (1961); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 228 (1964).

14. See Note, Defendant Access to Prosecution Witness Statements in Federal and
State Criminal Cases, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 471 (1983).
15. For a straightforward treatment of the various criminal discovery devices available under federal law, see Rakoff, How to Discover the Federal Government's Proofin
Criminal Cases, 29 PRAC. LAW., July 15, 1983, at 13.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
17. On state open record laws and law enforcement and investigatory information,
see 2 B.A. BRAVERMAN & F.J. CHETWYND, INFORMATION LAW: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, PRIVACY, OPEN MEETINGS, OTHER ACCESS LAWS § 24-5.2.2 (1985); BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. NCJ-95787, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INFORMATION AND POLICY: INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE RECORDS 7779 (1984).
18. I acknowledge my debt to an exhaustive student note on this subject by Jordan,
Kehoe & Schechter, Note, supra note 3. On disadvantages of discovery-motivated FOIA
requests, see infra at notes 54-62 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 3, at 134-38;

1 B.A.
19.

BRAVERMAN

& F.J.

CHETWYND,

Note, supra note 3, at 133.

supra note 17, § 3-2.6.
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the lack of a time limit within which the government must respond to a
discovery motion and the largely untrammelled discretion of the trial
judge in that respect. 0 Third, in a discovery motion the accused must
show that the information sought is relevant and material to his defense,
that the request is reasonable, and that the information is within the
scope of the disclosure provisions in the Rules; whereas the FOIA requires no showing of reasonableness or relevance.2" Thus, the FOIA is
"the only way for the criminal practitioner to obtain marginally relevant
but potentially useful prosecutorial documents such as policy guidelines,
prosecutional workbooks, and statistical files." 22 Fourth, the government,
not the accused, carries the burden of proof under the FOIA as to the
applicability of one or more of the nine exemptions from disclosure.2"
Fifth, and most important, some records that would not be discoverable
under the Rules or that would be the subject of privilege are likely available under the FOIA.' 4 Finally, the scope of curial review differs significantly; an appellate court will reverse a trial judge's discovery ruling
only for abuse of discretion, whereas under the FOIA the district court
must consider the matter de novo and reverse if the agency's decision is
incorrect.2" Furthermore, the FOIA applies to agencies of the United
States Government, and the wide definition of "agency" covers many
bodies from which an accused might desire "records,"' 6 including the
FBI, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 7
The United States-courts, however, are specifically excluded from the

20. Id. at 71.
21. Id. at 132-33.
22,

LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND PRI-

AcT 229 (A. Adler 14th ed. 1989) [hereinafter Adler].
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). A similar provision appears in the Australian Freedom
of Information Act, 1982, [1982] 1 AusT. AcTs. P. § 61, but there is no such provision
in New Zealand's Official Information Act, 1982, 1982 N.Z. Stat. No. 156. See Commissioner of Police v. Ombudsman, [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 578 (H.C.) (Jeffries, J.).
24. See Note, supra note 3, at 139-59 (arguing that witness lists, prosecution guidelines, and instructions to prosecutors are disclosable under the FOIA but are not discoverable under the Rules).
25. Id. at 76-77, 133.
26. The FOIA covers only "records," a term it does not define. For a good discussion
of what "record" might mean, see Note, What is a Record? Two Approaches to the
Freedom of Information Act's Threshold Requirement, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 408. In the
criminal discovery context it has been said that the record limitation on FOIA access
probably excludes only unrecorded oral statements and physical evidence. Note, supra
note 3, at 101.
27. Note, supra note 3, at 78-79.
VAcy
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coverge of the FOIA.28
Notwithstanding the apparent utility of the FOIA as an alternative or
adjunct to criminal discovery, several courts have refused to permit
broader disclosure under the FOIA than that provided by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.29 These cases rely on the following dicta
in Supreme Court cases concerning the interaction of the FOIA and civil
and administrative discovery regimes: "The Act is fundamentally
designed to inform the public about agency action and not to benefit
private litigants";"0 "FOIA was not intended to function as a private
discovery tool";"1 "The primary purpose of the FOIA was not to benefit
private litigants or to serve as a substitute for civil discovery."" In applying this dicta to the criminal discovery context, these courts have reasoned that: discovery in criminal proceedings is "governed" by the Federal Rules, and neither the FOIA nor its legislative history disclosed any
intention to amend the Rules;"3 the FOIA was not intended to enlarge
the scope of criminal discovery beyond that provided in the Rules and
specifically cannot supersede the well-established relevancy and materiality requirements of criminal discovery law;3 4 any use of the FOIA as a
"routine discovery device" would result in "a substantial displacement of
the balance established for criminal discovery by Rule 16";"5 FOIAdriven pre-trial disclosure would result in substantial harm to the government's case by diverting scarce resources away from the presentation

28. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B).
29. United States v. District Court, 717 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Buckley, 586 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979); United States
v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977); Fruehauf Corp. v. Thornton, 507 F.2d 1253
(6th Cir. 1974). See also Stimac v. Department of Justice, 620 F. Supp 212, 213
(D.D.C. 1985).
30. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975). See also Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974), strongly criticized in
this respect by 1 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 5.7, at 324-26 (2d ed.
1978).
31. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (emphasis in
original).
32. Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 n.14 (1982).
33. Murdock, 548 F.2d at 602. In Murphy v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 1134, 1142
(D.D.C. 1980), the District Court for the District of Columbia said that exemption
(7)(A) was designed precisely to prevent disclosure in advance of that provided by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court relied on a statement by Senator Hart
during the 1974 amendment debate that the exemption prevented harm to the government's case "by not allowing an opposing litigant earlier or greater access to investigative
files than he would otherwise have."
34. Murdock, 548 F.2d at 602-03; United States v. District Court, 717 F.2d at 482.
35. District Court, 717 F.2d at 481; Murdock, 548 F.2d 599.
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of the case to processing FOIA requests;36 defense use of the FOIA instead of Rule 16 would circumvent reciprocal discovery rights of the
prosecution; 7 and FOIA access would operate as a device to delay ongoing litigation."
Thus, the present majority position, representing the views of the
Courts of Appeals of three of the twelve federal circuits, limits considerably use of the FOIA as a pre-trial discovery tool. Only in one case, however, has the issue arisen squarely for decision, 9 and, as yet, the Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider the applicability of the
FOIA in the criminal discovery sphere. Moreover, even in those circuits
that have taken a restrictive approach, the FOIA remains available as an
alternative to conventional criminal discovery as long as FOIA disclosure

36. District Court, 717 F.2d at 481.
37. Id. at 482.
38. Id.; Murdock, 548 F.2d at 602.
39. The issue arose clearly for decision in District Court, 717 F.2d 478. In Fruehauf
Corp. v. Thornton, 507 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1974), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to stay a pending criminal conspiracy trial in order to allow defense counsel: (1)
to review and assemble voluminous material made available by virtue of a discovery
order; and (2) to defend an appeal by the prosecution from a district court order under
the FOIA to disclose requested materials and, if successful, to assemble and review that
material. In refusing the stay, the Court of Appeals took account of these factors: (1) the
petitioners had already received the benefit of extensive discovery in the criminal proceeding; (2) the trial had been pending for a considerable time; (3) it was apparent that
another application for further discovery might be made in "what promise[dl to be a
protracted trial," (4) there was no reason to believe the district court would not accord
the accused a fair trial and grant by discovery that to which they were entitled; (5) any
errors with respect to discovery could be corrected on appeal; and (6) "the Freedom of
Information Act was not intended to serve as a substitute for criminal discovery." Id. at
1254. The accused succeeded after protracted litigation in securing the desired information under the FOIA. Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS, 369 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Mich.), aft'd, 522
F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds 429 U.S. 1085, on remand 566
F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1977).
In United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977), the FOIA was not
pleaded at trial; indeed no request under the Act appears to have been made. The Act
was raised for the first time on appeal (from conviction) on the ground that the trial
judge erred in ruling on a discovery motion that certain documents need not be disclosed.
The appellant, appearing for himself, argued as an alternative to the criminal discovery
rules that the documents were disclosable under the FOIA. The case United States v.
Buckley, 586 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1978), following Murdock, is similar. Both decisions,
however, are suspect on the ground that district courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate
upon an FOIA suit until a request has been made in the proper form and denied in
whole or in part and administrative remedies have been exhausted. For a careful and, it
is submitted, correct treatment of this issue, see United States v. Steele, 799 F.2d 461
(9th Cir. 1986).

1990]
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would not exceed that provided by the Federal Rules.' 0
The courts taking this approach have failed to observe that the Supreme Court has also said that an FOIA requester's rights under the
FOIA "are in [no] way diminished by its being a private litigant, but
neither are they enhanced by [the requester's] particular, litigation-generated need for these materials."' 1 The FOIA directs, absent applicable
exemption, that requested documents be disclosed to "any person" regardless of need or purpose. Properly understood, the FOIA is "litigation neutral" in that it does not contemplate consideration of the requester's identity, status, or the intended use of the agency records.' 2
Any judicially imposed exclusion of litigants (civil or criminal) from the
FOIA would create a "status" exemption contrary to the clear words of
the FOIA"' and inconsistent with the FOIA's basic goal of providing all
or any member of the public with access to information about the operations of government.'" As Professor K.C. Davis has pointed out:
The legislative history is clear that "any person" means any person. One
who is entitled to records under the FOIA does not lose his entitlement by
becoming involved in a proceeding. The nine exemptions are only nine.
Congress has not enacted a tenth exemption for records that are to be used
in a proceeding. The FOIA is entirely clear . . ..
This is especially true in the criminal law context because the individual's involvement in the proceeding is involuntary and the presumption
of innocence operates.' 6
There is some judicial support for application of the FOIA in criminal
40. This is clear from the Ninth Circuit's "interpretation" of United States v.
Brown, 562 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1977), in District Court, 717 F.2d 478.
41. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 n.23 (1978). See also
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975).
42. Adler, supra 22, at 225-26. See Fiumara v. Higgins, 572 F. Supp. 1093, 10991100 (D. N.H. 1983).
43. Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792-93 n.6 (6th Cir. 1972); M. Farbman & Sons
Inc. v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 75, 79-80, 464 N.E.2d 437,
439, 476 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71 (1984) (New York's Freedom of Information Law was
modeled on the FOIA).
44. Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act for Discovery Purposes, 43
MD. L. REV. 119, 127 (1984).
45. 1 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.7, at 46 (2d ed. Supp.
1982). For discussion of the policy problems with the "any person" standard, see I J.T.
O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DIscLosuRE: PROCEDURES, FORMS AND THE LAw
§ 4.05 (Oct. 1979).
46. For a similar argument that denial of adequate pre-trial discovery undermines
the presumption of innocence, see Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1193; Brennan, Remarks
on Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 56, 57 (1963).
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proceedings. In United States v. Wahlin47 the accused, charged with excise tax evasion, filed a discovery motion under Rule 16 seeking access to
Internal Revenue Service private letter rulings necessary for the preparation of his defense. At the hearing on the discovery motion the accused
argued that apart from Rule 16 the material was available under the
FOIA. The prosecution countered that the accused must commence an
independent civil suit under the FOIA for disclosure of the information. 8 Chief Judge Reynolds reacted strongly to that suggestion:
The Government's contention that defendant cannot rely on the Freedom of Information Act to obtain discovery in a criminal action is preposterous. It would be absurd and dilatory to require that a defendant commence an independent civil suit for disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act to acquire the information sought and then return to
court with,the information to be used in his criminal defense. If this were
required, this court would be obligated by basic fairness to hold the criminal action in abeyance until defendant either obtained or was denied the
information sought. The applicability of the Freedom of Information Act
to specific documents or information sought can be determined by this
court in a discovery motion filed in a pending criminal case as easily as it
can be determined in an independent civil suit. Thus, judicial economy
and basic fairness demand that a defendant in a criminal action have
available to him the information he is entitled to as an ordinary member
of the public.4'

The passage is in line with sympathies expressed by the Sixth Circuit, 50
and the Ninth Circuit initially approved of this passage in United States
v. Brown,51 but later retreated from it,5" While this case law primarily
concerns the district court's jurisdiction to consider the FOIA and criminal discovery motions together, 53 the judges concerned are clearly sympathetic to use of the FOIA as a criminal discovery tool.
Even if defendants can use the FOIA as a supplement to, or in lieu of,

47. 384 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
48. See United States v. Gavran, 620 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (E.D. Wis. 1974), affid,
845 F.2d 1023 (7th Cir. 1988).

49. 384 F. Supp. at 47.
50. See Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792-93 n.6 (6th Cir. 1972).
51. 562 F.2d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 1977).
52. United States v. District Court, 717 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1983).
53. United States v. Wahlin, 384 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Wis. 1974) and United States
v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1977) are subject to the same criticism leveled at some
of the cases denying the application of the FOIA in the criminal discovery sphere. See
supra note 39. But if the FOIA request has been properly made and declined, and administrative appeal exhausted, then the sentiments expressed in these cases are agreeable.
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criminal discovery, they can encounter considerable difficulties with timing, especially in view of the federal Speedy Trial Act's requirement that
the accused in a federal criminal prosecution be tried within one hundred days of arrest." The FOIA provides very short response times to
requests but, even if FOIA subject agencies meet them (which, in practice, the busiest agencies, such as the FBI, find impossible), 55 a refusal to
disclose upheld on mandatory internal review and challenged immediately in the district court will take a minimum of sixty days to be ready
for court adjudication.56 In practice it usually takes much longer.57 The
FOIA once provided for expedited hearing of FOIA suits, but Congress
removed this feature in 1984.11 Furthermore, as the FOIA gives the litigant-requester no greater or lesser rights than any other requester,"9 the
prevailing view is that pending litigation is not a good reason to expedite
the FOIA request.6 0 Thus, the accused cannot rely upon the FOIA as "a
speedy discovery device.""1 If the government fights a FOIA suit, it will
likely be resolved years after the criminal trial; any material disclosed
will be relevant (if at all) to post-conviction appeal or post-appeal challenge but certainly will not assist defense counsel in preparing for the
trial itself. For this reason one practicing lawyer has commented that the

54. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (c). See generally Misner, Legislatively Mandated Speedy
Trials, 8 CRIM. L.J. 17 (1984).
55. See Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); Tomlinson, supra note 44, at 149 n.156.
56. If the agency decides to withhold requested records, it must notify the requester
within 10 working days after the request is received. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1988).
At that time, the agency informs the requester of the right to have the decision reviewed
by the agency head, and, if the right is exercised, the agency has 20 working days to
make its final determination. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). Both deadlines are subject to limited
extension, id. § 552(a)(6)(B), but if the agency fails to comply with any deadline the
requester is deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies and can go to the
district court. Id. § 552(a)(6)(C), (a)(4)(B). Upon filing a complaint in the appropriate
district court, the agency has 30 days to plead unless the court extends the deadline "for
good cause shown." Id. § 552(a)(4)(C).
57. See Grunewald, Freedom of Information Act Dispute Resolution, 40 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1, 19-21 (19881.

58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(D), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. 4, § 402(2), 98
Stat. 3357 (1984). The court may still in its discretion expedite an FOIA case "if good
cause therefor is shown." 28 U.S.C. § 1657 (Supp. V 1987).
59. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
60. See Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 613-14
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Tomlinson, supra note 44, at 127-28 n.24 (citing cases). See also
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Carlucci, 835 F.2d 1282, 1287 (9th Cir.
1987) (waiver of fees).
61. Jacoby, The Uses of FOJA and FOIL, 16 TRIAL LAW. Q. 12, 19 (1984).
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value of the FOIA as a pre-trial criminal discovery tool is "overrated in
all but exceptional cases."'2
Courts could order a stay or adjournment to overcome this timing
problem, but on the whole they have been unwilling to do so.6 Almost
all cases have arisen in the administrative discovery context, and the denial of stays there reflects the judicial view that use of the FOIA in
agency proceedings interferes with settled agency discovery rules that are
often intentionally restrictive." In the infinitesimal case law on this issue
in the criminal discovery context, the courts also seem sensitive to the
problems of abuse and delay and the "danger of circumventing the strict
criminal discovery rules" 65 by use of the FOIA 6 But the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, although recognizing that conflicts can arise where
civil FOIA suits and criminal discovery motions both go forward simultaneously, thought that the conflicts would be minimal in nature and
could be handled by the courts.6 7
At the heart of the debate over the utility of criminal discovery-motivated use of the FOIA is whether the law entitles a criminal defendant
to more material under the FOIA than by conventional criminal discovery. This depends in large part on the scope of the exemptions from
disclosure in the FOIA. The FOIA has nine exemptions, three of which
have special relevance in the criminal discovery context. 8
The FOIA's exemption (3) protects records "specifically exempted
from disclosure by statute" provided that the statute leaves no discretion
62. Rakoff, supra note 15, at 30. The primary value of the FOIA, according to
Rakoff, relates to post-verdict and post-appeal motions involving newly-discovered evidence or allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. See also Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d
408, 410-11 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d 1213, 1217-18 (3d Cir. 1981),
modifled, 671 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1982).
63. An adjournment or "discontinuance" would not jeopardize the criminal proceeding under the 1974 Speedy Trials Act if the judge made an order under 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(8) (1988) that the "ends of justice" required resolution of the FOIA suit. Cf
Tomlinson, supra note 44, at 183-84.
64. Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Actions: The Freedom of Information
Act and the Federal Discovery Rules, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 843, 867 (1981).
65. See Jupiter Painting Contracting Co. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593, 597 n.5
(E.D. Penn. 1980) (civil tax case).
66. Fruehauf Corporation v. Thornton, 507 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1974).
67. Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972). See also M. Farbman & Sons
Inc. v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 75, 82, 464 N.E.2d 437,
440, 476 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72 (1984) ("The potential for abuse.., is in a sense a price of
open government, and should not be invoked to undermine the statute.") (civil discovery/
FOIA case).
68. For a more extensive but now somewhat dated treatment, see Note, supra note 3,
at 101-26.
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on the issue of withholding or establishes particular criteria for withholding."9 This exemption clearly covers the Jencks Act and hence denies
70
pretrial FOIA access to witness "statements" as defined in that Act.
Exemption (5) covers "matters that are . . . inter-agency or intraagency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to
a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 7' This cryptic provision has been the subject of considerable judicial exegesis, with
heavy reliance on legislative history, and has been held to incorporate by
"rough analogy" the privileges normally available to a party engaged in
civil litigation,72 including the attorney-client privilege, the attorney
work product privilege,7 and the so-called executive or deliberative privilege. 4 The latter privilege is designed to protect the free flow of full and
frank opinion in administrative policy formation and decision-making. In
interpreting this aspect of the exemption, the courts have distinguished
between factual material and opinion, holding the former to be disclosable under the FOIA.7 5 Hence, on this view, material that is purely
factual but not always available on discovery, such as witness lists and
the like, would fall outside the exemption and be accessible under the
FOIA." But note that the exemption does protect the prosecution lawyer's work product,7 7 and, more recently, courts have held the work

69.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).

70. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 253 n.10 (Powell, J.,
dissenting in part). See discussion of the Jencks Act supra note 9 and accompanying text.
It has not been authoritatively decided whether the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
qualify as a "statute" for this purpose, but if so, Rule 16(2) protecting attorney work
product would satisfy exemption (3). See infra note 77.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
72. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973).
73. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975); FTC v. Grolier Inc.,
462 U.S. 19 (1983). In contrast to the Anglo-Australian approach of a single solicitorclient privilege, the United States practice has been to separate attorney-client privilege
and attorney work product privilege. See generally Gardner, Privilege and Discovery:

Background and Development in English and American Law, 53

GEo.

L.J. 585, 589

(1965).

74. Mink, 410 U.S. at 89. See generally Note, Discovery of Government Documents
and the Official Information Privilege, 76 COLJM. L. REv. 142 (1976).
75. See generally 1 K.C. DAvis, supra note 30, §§ 5.33-5.37.
76. See Note, supra note 3, at 105-11; Mervin v. FTC, 591 F.2d 821, 825-6 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724, 734-37 (5th Cir.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 214 (1978); Deering Milliken Inc. v. Irving,
548 F.2d 1131, 1138 (4th Cir. 1977); Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 49293 n.15 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
77. The work product doctrine evolved in civil proceedings but applies equally in the
criminal context, United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1974), and has been held to
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product privilege to protect from FOIA disclosure purely factual material such as witness statements. 8
The last exemption of relevance is the seventh one."9 As originally
enacted in 1966, exemption (7) provided for the withholding of "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent
available by law to a party other than an agency." 80 In the mid-1970s
congressional concern over judicial unwillingness to scrutinize claims of
exemption under this head coincided with the Watergate hysteria to produce a significantly tighter exemption (7)81 covering:
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or
an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the
case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the
course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful
national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques
and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel ..."

protect from discovery lawyers' interview notes and witness statements prepared by prosecution lawyers. See Feldman, The Work ProductRule in CriminalPracticeand Procedure, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 495, 507-10, 516-20 (1981) (citing cases). Most of the cases
antedate 1966 because since then Rule 16(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
has prohibited disclosure of "reports, memoranda, witness statements, or other internal
documents made by an attorney or his agents in connection with the investigation, prosecution or defense of a case." Id. at 496. Several commentators have criticized this protection as overbroad and not required by the policy objectives at work in this area of the
law. Id. at 497-98. Note, "Work Product" in Criminal Discovery, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q.
321; Waits, Work Product Protectionfor Witness Statements: Time for Abolition, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 305.

78. See United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 800 n.17 (1984); Martin v. Special Counsel, Merits System Protection Bd., 819 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
affd 823 F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1987). Contra Kilroy v. NLRB, 633 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.
Ohio 1985), affid without op., 823 F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1987). Note the "intra-agency"
limitation on exemption (5) places limits on protection of statements by non-governmental employees. See, e.g., Thurner Heat Treating Corp. v. NLRB, 839 F.2d 1256 (7th
Cir. 1988). See generally Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Broad Protectionfor Witness Statements, FOIA UPDATE 4-5 (1987).

79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
80. Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 7, 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967).
81. See Hatch, Balancing Freedom of Information with Confidentialityfor Law Enforcement, 9 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 7-14 (1983).
82. Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 (1974).
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In 1986 Congress again amended exemption (7), this time in response to
strong pressure to give greater protection under the FOIA to law enforcement information. 8 As amended, the exemption provides protection
for "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes",
thus eliminating the requirement that the records be "investigatory" in
nature, and requires only that disclosure "could reasonably be expected"
to cause one of the numerated harms."
Considerable case law addresses exemption (7), but the opinions seldom specifically address criminal discovery issues. Nevertheless, much
case law exists concerning pre-hearing FOIA access to witness statements and other material in administrative adjudicatory proceedings that
indicates the courts' likely approach. 5 One of the leading cases on this
point, National Labor Relations Board v. Robbins Tire & Rubber
Co.,8 6 bears study.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), after investigation,
filed an unfair labor practice complaint against defendant Robbins. In
order to prepare for the hearing before the NLRB, Robbins requested
under the FOIA copies of all potential witness statements collected during the investigation. The request was denied, among other reasons, on
the ground that the statements were "investigatory records compiled for
law enforcement purposes" and that disclosure "would interfere with enforcement proceedings" (exemption (7)(A)). Upon challenge, the district
court held exemption (7)(A) inapplicable; the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.8s
The Fifth Circuit viewed the 1974 amendment as requiring the
NLRB to show that some specific harm might result from disclosure in
this particular case.8 8 While the court accepted that disclosure of witness
statements might pose some risk of "interference" with NLRB proceed83. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1802, 100 Stat. 3207-48 to 3207-49 (1986). Earlier attempts to amend the FOIA in this respect are chronicled annually in Notes, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act, 1984 DUKE L.J. 377, 382-3; 1985 DUKE
L.J. 742, 750-53; 1986 DuE L.J. 384, 390-91.
84. Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, enacted in Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1802(a), 100 Stat. 3207-48. Other changes include expansion of exemptions (7)(D), (E) and (F).
85. For the case law, see Note, Backdooring the NLRB: Use and Abuse of the
Amended FOIA for Administrative Discovery, 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 145 (1976); Note,
NLRB Discovery after Robbins: More PerilforPrivateLitigants, 47 FORDHAM L. REv.
393 (1978). On administrative discovery generally, see Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency
Adjudication, 1971 DuKE L.J. 89.
86. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
87. 563 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1977).
88. Id. at 728.
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ings in the form of witness intimidation, the NLRB introduced no evidence tending to show that this kind of intimidation was likely to occur
in this case and therefore failed to discharge its burden of bringing exemption (7)(A) into play.89
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the "particularized, case-bycase showing" of interference favored by the Fifth Circuit in favor of a
so-called "generic" determination that disclosure of certain kinds of
materials (such as witness statements) prior to hearing will "interfere
with enforcement proceedings." 0 An obvious risk of coercion and intimidation of witnesses existed so that the NLRB did not have to show it to
be likely in any particular case.9" The Supreme Court relied on a contrast between the wording of exemption 7(A) and the other parts of that
exemption, 2 and particularly on the legislative history of the 1966 and
1974 FOIAs. 3 The discovery-motivated use of the FOIA plainly troubled the majority, which said that FOIA disclosure would disturb the existing delicate balance of NLRB practice and would cause delays while
FOIA matters were litigated."4 The Court was reluctant "to override a
long tradition of agency discovery" (albeit extremely limited) "based on
nothing more than an amendment to a statute designed to deal with a
wholly different problem. . ...
"9 The Court remarked finally that the
"FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool."98
Despite attempts to limit the Robbins holding to the labor relations
context,97 its rationale would seem applicable to discovery-motivated use
of the FOIA in the criminal discovery context. The alleged danger of
witness intimidation has been a mainstay argument against liberalizing
criminal discovery,98 and as noted above, the Federal Rules do not pro-

89. Id. at 730, 733.
90. 437 U.S. at 222-24.
91. Id. at 239.
92. Id. at 223-24 (Exemption (7)(A) speaks in the plural voice about "enforcement
proceedings," while exemptions (7)(B), (C), and (D) refer to particular cases).
93. Id. at 224-36.
94. Id. at 236-38.
95. Id. at 239.
96. Id. at 242 (emphasis in original). But see supra note 41 and accompanying text
(discussing the qualification in note 23 on page 234 of the case).
97. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 116 ("[I]t may be risky to generalize from the
labor relations setting to the criminal context."). But compare J.P. Stevens Co. v. Perry,
710 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983).
98. See, e.g., State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953), affd, 17 N.J.
100, 110 A.2d 99 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955). For good discussions of the
opposing views on this issue, see C.A. WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 252; 2 Y. KAMISAR,
W.R. LAFAVE & J.H. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS
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vide for pre-trial disclosure of witness statements. Indeed, Justices Stevens and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger joined the majority opinion in Robbins only on the understanding that its rationale applied
equally to all enforcement proceedings." In their view "[a] statute that
authorized discovery greater than that available under the rules normally
applicable to an enforcement proceeding would 'interfere' with the proceeding." 100 On this view, use of the FOIA as a discovery tool would
constitute interference per se.101 Since the Robbins decision, Congress
has passed the FOIA Reform Act of 1986, which relaxed the harm standard in exemption (7) from "would" to "could reasonably be expected"
to interfere with enforcement proceedings.1 2 This strengthens the protection for this type of information.
Exemption (7)(C) gives similar protection to the names and addresses
of persons interviewed in the course of regulatory and law enforcement
investigations.1 0 3 It permits withholding of records compiled for law enforcement purposes whose release could reasonably be expected to "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy".' To determine
whether an invasion of privacy is unwarranted, a court must balance the
extent and seriousness of the invasion against the public benefit in disclosure. The courts have generally held that the privacy interests of those
interviewed during law enforcement investigations outweigh any public
interest or benefit in disclosure.10 5 This is so even though the person
interviewed did not give the information in confidence 0 6 and might tes-

AND QUESTIONS

99.

1149-50 (5th ed. 1980).

Robbins, 437 U.S. at 243.

100. Id.
101. See 1 B.A.

BRAVERMAN & F.J. CHETWYND, supra note 17, § 11-5.2, at 45152.
102. Supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
103. See generally B.A. BRAVERMAN & F.J. CHETWYND, supra note 17, § 11-7, at
458-63; Waldman, Privacy Versus Open Government: Section 7(C) Exemption of Freedom of Information Act, 1986 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 609; Hammitt, Privacy and the
FOIA: Law Enforcement Records, 14 AccEss REPoRTs/FOI 4 (1988).
104. There is no space here to treat exemption (6), which closely parallels exemption
(7)(C), except to say that it applies to a wider range of material and requires a showing
that disclosure is "clearly" unwarranted. See generally 1 B.A. BRAVERMAN & F.J.
CHETWYND, supra note 17, § 10. In the law enforcement field, exemption 7(C) offers
much broader protection than exemption 6. See Hammitt, supra note 103, at 5.
105. See, e.g., Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Cuccaro v. Secretary of Labor, 770 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1985).
106. Confidential sources are protected by exemption (7)(D). 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(7)(D). See New England Apple Council Inc. v. Donovan, 725 F.2d 139 (1st Cir.

1984).
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tify at a later hearing.10 7 In protecting from disclosure the identities of
those who help with law enforcement inquiries, the courts have stressed
the potential for harassment and intimidation, the stigma that attaches
from any connection with such investigations, and the effect disclosure
might have on law enforcement agencies' ability to gather information in
the future.'0 8 While the approach of some courts borders on a blanket
exclusion of this type of information under exemption (7)(C)," °9 the correct approach undertakes a case-by-case balancing of the relevant privacy and public interests.110 But outbalancing the privacy interests of
those who assist in law enforcement investigations requires a strong
showing of public benefit from disclosure.111 The requester's interest in
gathering documents to aid litigation is a private one and has been held
irrelevant unless it coincides with'-a public purpose or benefit.1 1 2 Similarly, exemption (7)(C) operates to prevent the identification of law enforcement officers, although the privacy interests of such officers are less
than those of private citizens and are more easily outweighed." 3 The
lowering of the risk of harm standard has broadened the protection of
exemption (7)(C) here as well. 1 4 Moreover, the exemption (7)(C) balancing approach cannot affect the protection given confidential sources of

107. There is a line of cases holding that exemption (7)(C) does not apply to witness
statements gathered in (usually) unfair labor practice investigations because the sources
are expected to testify at the hearing before the Board. See, e.g., Poss v. NLRB, 565 F.2d
654, 658 (10th Cir. 1977); Borton Inc. v. OSHA, 566 F. Supp. 1420 (E.D. La. 1983).
These cases, however, run against the grain of authority. Note also that such a potential
witness rule has been rejected in the exemption (7)(D) context. See United Technologies

Corp. v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1985). See also GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY AcTs § 1.10[4], at 1-168 to 1-169 (J.D. Franklin
& R.F. Bouchard 2d ed. Oct. 1989) [hereinafter Franklin & Bouchard] (citing cases).
108. See supra note 98; Lame v. Department of Justice, 654 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.
1981); Antonelli v. Sullivan, 732 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1983).
109. See 2 J.T. O'REILLY, supra note 45, § 17.09, at 17-44 (Dec. 1987).
110. See, e.g., Lame, 654 F.2d 917.
111. See, e.g., L & C Marine Transp. Ltd. v. United States, 740 F.2d 919 (11th Cir.
1984); Senate of Puerto Rico v. Department of Justice, 823 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
112. Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1981); Lloyd v. Marshall, 526 F. Supp.
485 (M.D. Fla. 1981); Miles v. Department of Labor, 546 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Pa.
1982); Kiraly v. FBI, 728 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1984); L & C Marine Transp., 740 F.2d
919.
113. See, e.g., Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Department of Justice, 739 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1984); Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d
623 (7th Cir. 1981). See generally Waldman, supra note 103, at 610-17; Hammitt,
supra note 103, at 7 (describing this as "[o]ne of the more troubling aspects" of (7)(C)).
114. Franklin & Bouchard, supra note 107, § 1.10[3], at 1-157 to 1-158 (Oct. 1989).
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information by exemption (7)(D)115 or the ability by exemption 7(F) to
withhold information whose release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any person, be that person a law
enforcement officer or citizen."' 6 Thus, as presently interpreted, exemption (7)(C) protects from disclosure much information necessary for trial
preparation but not always available by conventional criminal dis17
covery.2
Some have viewed the use of the FOIA to circumvent restrictive administrative discovery regimes (as in Robbins) or its use as an alternative
or adjunct to civil or criminal discovery rules as abusive. A movement
began in the early 1980s to amend the FOIA to prevent a party to ongoing judicial or administrative proceedings from requesting under the
FOIA records relating to the proceeding. 1 8 The amendment lapsed, but
not before a valuable study of alleged FOIA abuse showed the amendment to be unwarranted.1 9 The stu.dy found that use of the FOIA for
discovery purposes can be burdensome on agencies in several respects:
occasionally a litigant would gain access to records under the FOIA
without the knowledge of government counsel and produce them at trial
to the surprise of opposing counsel; litigants disrupted the government's
preparation for trial by seeking records under the FOIA on the eve of
trial; and litigants caused disruption by requesting documents both under
the FOIA and in discovery, necessitating duplicative searches and releases.1 20 These burdens were better alleviated, the study concluded, by a

115. Supra note 109. Exemption (7)(D) does not contain a balancing test.
116. The FOIA Reform Act expanded the protection under exemption (7)(F) from
"law enforcement personnel" to "any individual." Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1802(a), 100
Stat. 3207-48. Attempts to use the presence of exemption (7)(F) (and (7)(D)) in order to
cut back on the broad scope the courts have given exemption (7)(C) have failed. See New
England Apple Council Inc. v. Donovan, 560 F. Supp. 231 (D. Mass. 1983), rev'd, 725
F.2d 139 (1st Cir. 1984).
117. Cf Note, supra note 3, at 124 (discussing the futility of protecting information
that will be revealed at trial). See Maxwell & Reinsch, The Freedom of Information Act
PrivacyExemptions: Who Does It Really Protect?,7 COMM. & L. 45 (Apr. 1985) (arguing in the context of exemption (6) that instead of protecting only the privacy of individuals the exemption has been used to protect the privacy of the agencies); Hammitt, supra
note 103, at 6.
118. For a description of the proposal, see Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1986, 1987 DUKE L.J. 521, 523-24.
119. The Report by Professor Edward Tomlinson of the University of Maryland
Law School was commissioned by the Administrative Conference of the United States
and was published in article form. See supra note 44, at 194-200 (objections to the
proposed amendment).
120. Id. at 200-2.
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specific requirement that parties in litigation with the government notify
government counsel of all discovery-motivated FOIA requests, thereby
preventing surprise and permitting coordination of searches and releases,
than by a blanket closing of the FOIA to parties to litigation. 21 The
study reported no evidence of any undue burdens or abuses arising from
use of the FOIA in the criminal discovery sphere. 22
Despite the high hopes of the early commentators, to date the FOIA
has had little impact on federal criminal discovery practice. The reasons
stated above have had some impact, but the major factor is a lack of
judicial enthusiasm for the endeavor. Judges seem unwilling to allow the
FOIA to supplement (and thereby effectively amend) 23 what might be
called the partial code of pre-trial discovery in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. These rules apply to federal criminal proceedings
across a vast country and are designed to provide uniform and minimum
disclosure by way of discovery to be supplemented by the exercise of
judicial discretion in appropriate cases. 24 Discovery-motivated use of the
FOIA disturbs the delicate balance of interests' 25 reflected in the Federal
Rules. Judges would no doubt prefer the issue of broader criminal discovery to be hammered out in the federal rule revision process rather
than case-by-case in court, because such FOIA requests force the court
at the micro level of a particular case to consider the macro-level arguments for and against broader criminal discovery.
III.

THE CANADIAN PosrriON

Criminal discovery has been the subject of considerable discussion in
Canada, 128 probably more so than in any other Commonwealth country.
The focal point in recent times has been the pioneering work of the Law
Reform Commission of Canada, whose studies, working paper, and (ten

121. Id.
122. The Senate Judiciary Committee asserted that "criminal defendants frequently
use the FOIA to disrupt the prosecutor's case preparation and to delay trial." Id. at 193,
citing S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1983). There is, however, no support in
Tomlinson's study for this assertion.
123. See Note, supra note 3, at 91.
124. See supra note 11.
125. Words used in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236
(1978).
126. See, e.g., Martin, PreliminaryHearings, 1955 SPECIAL LECTUMES L. Soc'y
UPPER CAN. 1; Hooper, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 50 CAN. B. REv. 445 (1972);
Wilkins, Discovery, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 355 (1975-1976); Branson, Discovery and Criminal
Proceedings, 17 CRIM. L.Q. 24 (1974-1975).
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years later) final Report on Criminal Discovery 2 7 have been influential
in law reform efforts abroad. 2 But the Commission's recommendations
have not yet attracted legislative attention at home. As a result, the extent of criminal discovery still varies a great deal across Canada.2 and
remains in large part within the discretion of the Crown prosecutor
(and, when challenged, the trial judge).1 3 There is precious little material that every defense counsel is entitled to before trial as a matter of
enforceable legal right. Perhaps in practice most defense counsel get
much of what they want or need most of the time, yet this proposition is
far from clear, and this highly discretionary regime is hardly satisfactory.131 It is curious, then, that the appearance of FOI legislation at the
federal level and in more than half of the provinces has not aroused the
interest of the defense bar. One must ask why defense counsel have ignored this potential source of pre-trial criminal disclosure.
A. ProvincialLegislation
Of the ten Canadian provinces, 3 2 the following have enacted FOI legislation: Nova Scotia (1977),33 New Brunswick (1978),'-' Newfound-

127. LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, WORKING PAPER No. 4, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE DISCOVERY (1974); LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, STUDY REPORT:
DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES (1974); LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: REPORT ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY (1974); LAw REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, REPORT No. 22, DISCLOSURE BY THE PROSECUTION
(1984). See also LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, WORKING PAPER No. 56, PUBLIC
AND MEDIA ACCESS TO THE CRIMINAL PROCESS

(1987); LAW

REFORM COMM'N OF

CANADA, REPORT No. 32, OUR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1988).

128.

In New Zealand the Criminal Law Reform Committee relied on the Commis-

sion's work. See CRIMINAL LAW REFORM COMM., REPORT ON DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES para. 4 (1986).

See R. v. Barnes, 12 Crim. Rep. (3d) 180 (D.C. Nfld. 1979); R.J. DELISLE &
473 (1986).
130. For an exhaustive survey of the Canadian law, see Ferguson, Discovery in
Criminal Cases, in 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CANADIAN LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 13
(J.J. Atrens, P.T. Burns & J.P. Taylor eds. 1987). See also B.A. GROSMAN, THE PROSECUTOR: AN INQUIRY INTO THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 74-77 (1969).
131. B.A. GROSMAN, supra note 130, at 74-77 (relating an example of the prosecutor disclosing information based on his relationship with defense counsel).
132. One of Canada's two territories has freedom of information legislation as well.
See Access to Information Act, Yuk. Stat. ch. 12 (1983).
133. Freedom of Information Act, N.S. Stat. ch. 10 (1977).
134. Right to Information Act, N.B. Acts ch. R-10.3 (1978).
129.

D.

STUART, LEARNING CANADIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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land (1981),135 Quebec (1982),136 Manitoba (1985), 8T and Ontario
(1987)138
The legislation in the first three provinces, all in the Atlantic region,
can be usefully looked at together. The Newfoundland Act covers the
Newfoundland Constabulary (the provincial police force responsible for
policing the more urban areas), but does not cover either the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (ROMP), which operate by agreement as provincial police in the rural areas, or the municipal police forces." 9 Such
also appears to be the case in Nova Scotia.14 0 The New Brunswick Act
covers neither the provincial police nor municipal police forces.'"' The
effect of this is two-fold. First, the police at all levels in New Brunswick,
and the municipal police in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, are free
from FOI requests during criminal investigations.' 4 2 Second, in those in-

135. The Freedom of Information Act, Nfld. Stat. ch. 5 (1981).
136. An Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information, Qu-

REV. STAT.

ch. A-2., Qu6 Stat. ch. 30, 601 (1982).

137. The Freedom of Information Act, Man. Stat. ch. 6 (1985). Proclaimed into
force on 30 September 1988. See List of Statutes in Continuing Consolidation of the
Statutes of Manitoba, Man. Stat. at 21 (1987-1988).
138. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1987, Ont. Stat. ch. 25

(1987).
139. The Newfoundland Constabulary is directly under the control of the Minister
of Justice, see The Constabulary Act, NFLD. REV. STAT. ch. 58, §§ 3, 8, 9 (1970), and
so is subject to the Newfoundland Act. I am grateful to the Ombudsman of Newfoundland, Mr. Ambrose Peddle, for drawing this to my attention. The list of departments
covered by the Newfoundland Act and the general class of information held by each is
published in Nfld. Gaz., May 7, 1982, pursuant to section 5 of the Newfoundland Act.
Nfld. Stat. ch. 5, § 5 (1981).
140. The definition of "department" in the Nova Scotia Act includes any "agency,
association, or other body of persons" all the members of which are appointed by Order
of the Governor in Council. N.S. Stat. ch. 10, § 2(d)(i) (1977). By The Constables Act,
N.S. REV. STAT. ch. 49, § 19(1) (1967), all provincial police constables are appointed by
the Governor in Council. Hence the provincial police force is a subject "department"
under the Act.
141. See NINETEENTH REPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NEW BRUNSWICK 16 (1985)
(case summary). Reports of investigations by the New Brunswick Police Commission
must be filed with the Minister of Justice, who also has access to all files and evidence
acquired during investigation, and this material can be requested from the Minister. See
Police Act, N.B. Acts, ch. P-9.2, § 22(8) (1977). I am grateful to the Ombudsman of
New Brunswick, Mr. Joseph B~rub6 for this information.
142. For good descriptions of the byzantine structure of the federal, provincial, and
municipal police forces in Canada, see Cooper, The Evolution of Canadian Police in
THE POLICE FUNCTION IN CANADA 37 (W.T. McGrath & M.P. Mitchell eds. 1981);
Grant, The Police: Organization, Personnel and Problems in THE PRACTICE OF FREEDOM: CANADIAN ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 405,
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stances in which the provincial or municipal police act as prosecutors-usually limited to provincial and municipal offenses, and to summary federal offenses of a minor nature in some parts of the provinces" 40-the legislation will apply only to provincial police prosecutors
in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, and not otherwise unless for some
reason the information has come into the hands of an agency subject to
the Acts before trial."
All serious or indictable offenses, however, are prosecuted by the
Crown attorney or the equivalent representing the Attorney General of
the Province.1 45 Under the Canadian Constitution, enforcement of the
federally enacted Criminal Code falls to the provincial Attorneys General.1 46 As all of the Atlantic provinces' legislation covers the office of the
provincial Attorney General," 7 it follows that FOI requests can be directed to the Attorney General for documents held 48 by prosecuting employees of the Department or Ministry, be they styled Crown counsel,
Crown attorneys, or prosecuting officers.1 49 This overcomes the first hurdle to criminal discovery-motivated FOI requests.
At this point, however, the breadth of the law enforcement exemptions
in the legislation will likely thwart FO requests by defense counsel. The
Nova Scotia Act, the least satisfactory of the three Acts in that it gives a
right of access only to listed categories of information, 15' exempts from
disclosure information that "would be likely to disclose information ob-

406-09 (R. St. J. MacDonald & J.P. Humphrey eds. 1979).
143. See NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: JUSTICE
SERVICES IN CANADA 1977-78, at 55-56 (1979) (detailing the practice in each province)
[hereinafter NATIONAL TASK FORCE].
144. See TwENTY-FIRST REPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NEW BRUNSWICK 3 (1987)

(case summary); infra note 159 and accompanying text.
145. The title of the prosecutor varies from province to province. See generally P.C.
STENNING,

APPEARING FOR THE CROWN:

A

LEGAL AND

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF

161-63 (1986).
146. See Constitution Act 1867, R.S.C. app. II, No. 5, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3, 91(27),
92(14) (1985); Criminal Code III R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 2 (1985) (definition of
"prosecutor").
147. N.S. Stat. ch. 10, § 2(d) (1977); N.B. Acts. ch. R-10.3, § 1 (1978); Nfld. Stat.
ch. 5, § 2(a) (1981). For the history of the Office of the Attorney General in these
provinces and the current legislation, see P.C. STENNING, supra note 145, at 161-62.
148. N.S. Stat. ch. 10, § 2(f) (1977) (information "on file or in the possession or
under the control of a department"); N.B. Acts ch. R-10.3, §§ 1, 3(1) (1978) (information "kept or filed"); Nfld. Stat. ch. 5, § 2(c) (1981) (information "on file or in the
possession or under the control of a department").
149. Supra note 145.
150. See N.S. Stat. ch. 10, § 3 (1977); Evans, Nova Scotia Freedom of Information
Act, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 494, 495-96 (criticizing the Act).
CRIMINAL PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY IN CANADA
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tained or prepared during the conduct of an investigation concerning alleged violations of any enactment or the administration of justice."'15 '
This is a "class" exemption that protects from disclosure any information falling within the described class irrespective of the actual harm, if
any, occasioned by disclosure.' 52 The Nova Scotia law enforcement exemption "add[s] insult to this no-injury approach" '53 by making it
mandatory for the decision-making official to withhold exempt information.1 54 While Newfoundland's law enforcement exemption is permissive
rather than mandatory, giving the decision-maker discretion to disclose
exempt documents, it is just as broad in scope, permitting nondisclosure
of information "respecting the enforcement of any law of Canada or the
province" or "the conduct of lawful investigations.' 5 5
As originally enacted, the New Brunswick Act denied a right to information15 6 on law enforcement grounds only when its release "would impede an investigation, inquiry or the administration of justice.' 5 The
withholding of documents on this ground required proof of impediment
to an investigation or the administration of justice (ultimately to the satisfaction of the Ombudsman and/or the Court of Queen's Bench), with
the onus of proof on the Minister. 5 8 But New Brunswick was not to
stay out of step with its neighbors for long. An episode involving a persistent FOI requester named Dixon resulted in the provincial legislature

151. N.S. Stat. ch. 10, § 4(e) (1977).
152. See Rankin, The New Access to Information and PrivacyAct: A Critical Annotation, 15 OTTAWA L. REV. 1, 12 (1983).
153. Id.
154. Class exemptions can be expressed in either permissive or mandatory language.
The former confers a discretion to release otherwise exempt records, and the latter com-

mands the decision-maker not to release exempt records. See id.
155. Nfld. Stat. ch. 5, § 11(b) (1981). The Ombudsman of Newfoundland knows of
no instance in which the Newfoundland Act has been used as a criminal discovery tool.
Letter from Ambrose Peddle to Michael Taggart (Mar. 2, 1989).
156. While section 6 denies a right to information under the Act where its release
would have one of the stated consequences in section 6(a) to (i), the statutory language
does not forbid disclosure outside the Act, in the exercise of executive discretion by Ministers or other high ranking self-authorizing officials. In this sense the exemptions are
permissive. See N.B. Acts ch. R-10.3, § 6 (1978).
157. Id. § 6(i). One commentator criticized the general character and vagueness of
the exemptions in section 6 (giving section 6(i) as an example) and lamented the Act's
failure to benefit from the extensive United States experience by dealing specifically and
in detail with points of difficulty. See McCamus, Comment in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES 219, 221-22 (J.D. McCamus ed. 1981) [hereinafter
CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES].

158.

N.B. Acts ch. R-10.3, § 12 (1978).
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placing a blanket of exclusion over law enforcement matters.1 59
The tale is a revealing one. In 1982 Dixon applied to the New Brunswick Department of Justice for a firearms acquisition certificate. The
application was refused initially, but at some later point a certificate was
issued. It came to Dixon's attention, however, that in the course of investigating the application, a Department of Justice official had made inquiries of the local Police Department, the RCMP, and the Crown
Prosecutors Office.16 0 Dixon requested "copies of all information, confidential or otherwise, the Department of Justice [had] in its possession
concerning [himself]."16 The Department denied having any information about Dixon and, on his further inquiry, simply did not reply.
Under the New Brunswick Act, a complaint can be made to the
Ombudsman or the Court,1 6 2 and, in the first instance, Dixon referred
the matter to the Ombudsman. An investigation by the Ombudsman uncovered twenty-four documents relating to Dixon in Department files.
The Minister of Justice released ninpteen of the twenty-four documents
and a twentieth document with one paragraph deleted.16 The
Ombudsman subsequently recommended the'release of the remaining
four documents and the deleted paragraph, but the Minister refused,
claiming the information was exempt under the law enforcement exemption."" Dissatisfied, Dixon took the matter to the New Brunswick Court
of Queen's Bench.
All the withheld documents concerned the investigation and prosecution of Dixon for two offenses in 1978. The documents included an undated police department investigation report summarizing in the most
general terms the nature of evidence to be given by several witnesses,
photocopies of typed statements of two victims on police department
statement forms, and a photocopy of a typed summary of the involvement of various witnesses with respect to the incidents. In relation to
these incidents, Dixon was charged, tried by jury, and acquitted. 6 5

159.

The following account is drawn from EIGHTEENTH REPORT OF THE
NEW BRUNsWIcK 2-3 (1984) [hereinafter EIGHTEENTH REPORT]; NINEREPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NEW BRUNSWICK 16-17 (1985); Dixon v. New

OMBUDSMAN,

TEENTH

Brunswick, 62 N.B.R.2d 137 (N.B. Ct. Q.B. 1985).
160. Dixon, 62 N.B.R.2d at 136. Section 106 of the Criminal Code appears to authorize the gathering of relevant information by an investigating firearms officer. Id. at
139; Ill R.S.C. ch. 0-46, § 106 (1985).
161. Dixon, 62 N.B.R.2d at 138; EIGHTEENTH REPORT, supra note 159, at 2.
162. N.B. Acts ch. R-10.3, § 7(1) (1978).
163. Dixon, 62 N.B.R.2d at 139.
"164. Id.
165. Id. at 141.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23.235

The trial judge had no doubt that the information was not exempt
under the Act and ordered its release. All the information, the judge
observed, became public knowledge at the trial. The police informants
testified as witnesses at the trial, and so their identities no longer required protection."' 0 Nor would release of the information "impede an
investigation, inquiry or the administration of justice,"16 7 for there was
nothing to impede; the investigation and trial had been held years
earlier1 6 8
The New Brunswick Legislature reacted swiftly in amending the
Right to Information Act to prevent future release not only of the type of
material disclosed by court order to Dixon,"6 9 but of much more as well.
The legislature added two new exemptions to section 6:
There is no right to information under this Act where its release
(h.1) would reveal information gathered by police, including the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, in the course of investigating any illegal activity or suspected illegal activity, or the source of such information;
(h.2) would disclose any information reported to the Attorney General or
his agent with respect to any illegal activity or suspected illegal activity, or
the source of such information. 1 "0
These amendments have extinguished the considerable potential the orig-

166. Id. Mr. Justice Stevenson opined that section 6(a) protects the confidentiality of
witness informers before trial. Id.
167. N.B. Acts. ch. R-10.3, § 6(i) (1978).
168. See Dixon, 62 N.B.R.2d at 141. Mr. Justice Stevenson did uphold exemption of
the deleted paragraph, as disclosure would have revealed "personal information, given on
a confidential basis, concerning another person." Id. See N.B. Acts ch. R-10.3, § 6(b)
(1978).
169. There is an epilogue to this tale. After the decision, Dixon, still not satisfied
that the department had disclosed all information relating to him, filed a further petition
with the Ombudsman. After a detailed investigation of all the departmental files relating
to Dixon (12 in all), the Ombudsman prepared a list of documents and submitted the list
to the department for its further consideration under the New Brunswick Act. After a
protracted review the Department indicated it was prepared to release all but nine of the
documents: those nine were said to be exempt under section 6(0, which protects legal
professional privilege. See TwzmrE'H REPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NEw BRUNSwicK 2-3 (1986) (Report No. 85-5180-4).
170. N.B. Acts ch. R-10.3, § 6 (1978), as amended by An Act to Amend the Right to
Information Act, N.B. Acts ch. 67 (1985). This gap-filling by amendment may be the
result of the general and vague character of the exemptions rather than a conscious or
deliberate decision to overturn the case that exposed the gaps. See Lane, New Brunswick's Act of 1978, in CANADA'S NEW AccEss LAWS: PUBLIC AND PERSONAL AccEss
To GOVERNMENTAL DOCUMENTS 77, 86 (D.C. Rowat ed. 1983).
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inal 1978 Act provided for criminal discovery-motivated requests.
Quebec's freedom of information law was enacted in 1982.171 Although Quebec is a civil law province, the law of criminal procedure is
federal and applies just as much in Quebec as in the common law provinces.172 The Quebec Act covers the provincial police force (SciretE du
Qu6bec), as well as the numerous municipal police forces, the Quebec
1 73
Police Commission, the Attorney General, and Crown prosecutors.
The Act's section 28 requires withholding of requested information by
law enforcement authorities if disclosure of such information would
17 4
likely impede judicial proceedings or hamper a criminal investigation.
Similar in wording to the original law enforcement exemption in the
New Brunswick Act, the Quebec FOI legislation likewise is a potential
source of criminal discovery. But if the reported decisions of the Commission d'acc6s A l'information are any indication, that potential is un17 5

tapped at present.

171. QuE Stat. ch. 30 (1982).
172. See P. BALIVEAU, J. BELLEMARE & J.P. LUSSIER, ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
35-36 (U. Muskatel trans. 1982).
173. The wide definition of "public body" in Quebec's freedom of information law
"means that virtually all bodies are subject to the Act." 3 R. DUSSAuLT & L. BORGEAT,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A TREATISE 304 (M. Rankin trans. 1989).
174. In its entirety the English language version of section 28 provides
A public body must refuse to release or to confirm the existence of informaton
received by a person responsible under the law for the prevention, detection or
repression of crime or statutory offences, if its disclosure would likely
(1) impede the progress of proceedings before a person or body carrying on
judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) hamper an investigation;
(3) reveal a method of investigation, a confidential source of information, or a
program or plan of action designed to prevent, detect or repress crime or statutory
offences;
(4) endanger the safety of a person;
(5) cause prejudice to the person who is the source or the subject of the
information;
(6) reveal the components of a communications system intended for the use of a
person responsible for law enforcement;
(7) reveal information transmitted in confidence by a police force having jurisdiction outside Quebec;
(8) facilitate the escape of a prisoner; or
(9) prejudice the fair hearing of a person's case.
Qu6 Stat. ch. 30, § 28 (1982).
175. For a comprehensive treatment of the jurisprudence on article 28, see Y.
DUPLESSiS & J. HkTU, Accks A ORGANISMES L'INFORMATION: LoI SUR L'ACCES AUX
DOCUMENTS DES ORGANISMES PUBLICS ET SUR LA PROTECTION DES RENSEIGNEMENTS

PERSONNELS: INDEX.E, ANNOT-E ET COMMENTE-

128-58 (1988).

262
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Similarly, the more recent provincial FOI legislation in Manitoba and
Ontario is not so one-sidedly protective of law enforcement matters. The
Manitoba FOIA, which was enacted in 1985 but did not come into force
until 1988, is the more straightforward and liberal of the two in this
respect. 170 Section 40(1) of that Act is couched in permissive language
and is predicated by a "harms" test:
The head of a department may refuse to give access to any record the
disclosure of which could reasonably be expected
(a) to be injurious either to the enforcement of an enactment or to the.
conduct of an investigation under an enactment; or
(b) to facilitate the commission of an offence or to threaten the security of
a correctional institution or other building, a computer or communications
system, or any other property or system; or

(c) to violate solicitor-client privilege; or
(d) to be injurious to the conduct of existing or anticipated legal
17
proceedings.

7

The Act makes clear that nothing in that subsection prevents disclosure
of unlawful investigations or of the use of investigative or enforcement
17 8
techniques that are contrary to law.

The Ontario Freedom of Information and Protection of Individual
Privacy Act 1987 makes similar provision, albeit more specifically and
hence at greater length:
A head may refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure could reasonably be expected to,
(a) interfere with a law enforcement matter ["law enforcement" is defined
in section 2 to mean "(a) policing, (b) investigations or inspections that
lead or could lead to proceedings in a court or tribunal if a penalty or
sanction could be imposed in those proceedings, and (c) the conduct of
proceedings referred to in ..

.(b)"];

(b) interfere with an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is
likely to result;
(c) reveal investigative techniques and procedures currently in use or
likely to be used in law enforcement; ...
La Commission d'acc~s a l'information (Commission of Access to Information) is the
independent Commission established by the Act to review decisions on access made under
the FOI law. See Qu6 Stat. ch. 30, §§ 103-134 (1982).
176. Man. Stat. ch. 6 (1985); see supra note 137.
177. Man. Stat. ch. 6, § 40(1) (1985).
178. Id. § 40(2). Another relevant exemption is id. § 41(1)(c) (mandatory exemption
of information which discloses identity of an informant who has disclosed information in
confidence for any purpose related to enforcement of an enactment).
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(e) endanger the life or physical safety of a law enforcement officer or any
other person;
(f) deprive a person of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication.
179

Remarkably, section 14 (2)(a) of the Ontario Act cuts across this harmsbased provision by authorizing a head tc.refuse to disclose any reports
prepared in the course of law enforcement, inspections, or investigations
by any agency 80 that has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law. The only independent operation of this subsection
will be to catch material that has passed muster under section
14(1)-records the disclosure of which could not reasonably be expected
to harm or interfere with any of the twelve defined law enforcement
interests. This subsection was not part of the law enforcement exemption
package recommended by the Williams Commission, on whose Report
the Ontario Act is based, 8" and is completely at odds with the careful
balancing of interests undertaken by the Commission and reflected in
section 14(1).112 Although the subsection is unjustifiable in principle, it
may prove a considerable barrier to use of the Act as a criminal discovery tool by exempting routine police reports and the like. The subsection's sole redeeming feature is that it is permissive.
In terms of coverage, the Manitoba and Ontario Acts both apply to
the Office of the Attorney General,"8 and so documents "in the custody
or under the control" of prosecuting employees will be requestable from

179. Ont. Stat. ch. 25, § 14(1)(a), (b), (c), (e), (f) (1987). Note this is a selection
from the 12 exemptions grouped under "law enforcement" in section 14(1).
180. See id. § 14(2)(a). The word "agency" is not defined in the Act, which typically
refers to those bodies subject to it as "institutions." I assume in the text that the term
includes the police.

181. 1-3 PUBLIC GOVERNMENT FOR PRIVATE PEOPLE: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY (1980) [hereinafter
PUBLIC GOVERNMENT FOR PRIVATE PEOPLE]. See generally McCamus, The Report of
the Ontario Commission on Freedom of Informatioi and Individual Privacy:A Synopsis, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 157, at 306; Eichmanis, History of Freedom of Information and Personal Privacy in Ontario, 2 INFO. & PRIVACY COMM'R/
ONT. NEWSLETTER 2-3 (1989).
182. 2 PUBUC GOVERNMENT FOR PRIVATE PEOPLE,

supra note 181, at 294-303;
McCamus, supra note 181, at 315-16 (discussing the Commission's suggested exemption
relating to law enforcement).
183. It is the "Department" of the Attorney General in Manitoba and the "Ministry" of the Attorney General in Ontario. Prosecuting employees of the Department of the
Attorney General in Manitoba are called Crown attorneys; those in Ontario are called
Crown counsel. See P.C. STENNING, supra note 145, at 114-24, 160-61.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 23.235

the Attorneys General.'1 4 Defendants may encounter more difficulty obtaining documents from Crown attorneys and assistant Crown attorneys
in Ontario.15 5 The Lieutenant Governor in Council appoints these persons under the Crown Attorneys Act,"8 6 and they are responsible to the
provincial Ministry of the Attorney General.187 That Ministry is
charged by statute with the conduct of all litigation for the Crown."8
Furthermore, by statute Crown attorneys are agents of the Attorney
General for the purposes of thei Criminal Code, a delegation to them of
the Attorney General's prosecutorial power.' 8 9 It is open to question
whether documents in the hands of Crown attorneys are "in the custody
or under the control" of the Ministry of the Attorney General and therefore subject to the Ontario Act. If not, what can be said to justify treating Crown counsel and Crown attorneys differently in this respect? Even
if one accepts that local Crown attorneys should be independent from
political control, as some commentators forcefully argue in other contexts,"90 their subjection to the Act promotes nonpolitical accountability
and does not infringe upon the reason cited for the claimed independence.
The Manitoba Act may apply to the provincial police, 9 " but it does
not extend to the RCMP in that capacity, or to municipal police forces
in that province. The Ontario Police Commission is subject to the Ontario Act,'" 2 but the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) are not." 3 While the

184. The wording is identical in both Acts. Compare Man. Stat. ch. 6, § 3 with Ont.
Stat. ch. 25, § 10(1) (1987).
185. This may well be a problem in other provinces, but in the interest of brevity
this Article will confine the treatment to Ontario.
186. Crown Attorneys Act, 2 ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 107, § 1 (1980).
187. P.C. STENNING, supra note 145, at 160.
188. Ministry of the Attorney General Act, 4 ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 271, § 5(h)
(1980).
189. Id. § 11. See supra note 145.
190. See Armstrong & Chasse, The Right to an Independent Prosecutor, 28 Grim.
Rep. New Series 160 (1975); Chasse, The Attorney General and the TraditionalCrown
Prosecutor: An Alternative View of ProsecutorialPowers, 4 CROWN CouNs. REv. 6
(1984-1985).
191. While the language of The Provincial Police Act, 3 MAN. REV. STAT. ch. P150 (1970), is not as strong as that in the Newfoundland Constabulary Act, NFLD. Ruv.
STAT. ch. 58 (1970), the Commissioner of the Manitoba Provincial Police is under the
"control" of the Attorney General, and this may be enough to bring that force within the
Department of the Attorney General for the purpose of the Manitoba Act. 3 MAN. REV.
STAT. ch. P-150, § 8(3) (1970). The provincial police do not qualify as a "crown
agency" as defined in the Manitoba Act, as the appointments are not by order of the
Lieutenant Governor in Council but rather under the Civil Service Act. Id. §§ 2, 6(1).
192. The Ontario Police Commission is designated as a subject "institution" in the
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Ministry of the Solicitor General has responsibility for the administration of the Police Act (which covers the OPP),1 one can hardly argue
that this makes records in the hands of the OPP disclosable under the
Ontario Act, notwithstanding the reference to "policing" in one of the
exemptions.1 95
The Ontario Act extends to local government in that province on January 1, 1991.19" The wording of the Act will clearly cover 41 of the 120
municipal police forces in the province.'
Whether the remaining 79
police forces will be covered is much less clear. 98 Obviously, it would be
highly anomalous if some forces are covered and others not. The passage
of the Municipal Freedom Information and Protection of Privacy Act in
December 1989 may remove the uncertainty by subjecting all municipal
police forces in Ontario to FOI legislation. 9 9
B.

The Federal Access to Information Act

In contrast with the incomplete coverage of the provincial legislation,
the federal Access to Information Act 1982 (AIA) fortunately covers the
major agencies for the administration of justice, including the federal police force (RCMP), the Department of the Solicitor General, and the
Department of Justice.2 00 The Department of Justice is responsible for

regulations. See Ont. Stat. ch. 25, § 2, para. 3(c) (1987) (definition of "institution"); Ont.
Reg. 532/87, reprinted in Ont. Gaz. Sept. 26, 1987, at 1987, 1996. See generally S.M.
MAKUCH & J. JACKSON, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ON-

95-98 (Commission on Freedom of Information and Individual Privacy, Research
Publication 1979) ("Police commissions are generally the most closed of all municipal
institutions . . ").
193. The Ontario Provincial Police Negotiating Committee is scheduled in the regulations, Ont. Gaz., supra note 192, at 1997, but the OPP itself is conspicuously absent.
194. See Ministry of the Solicitor General Act, 4 ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 271, § 5

TARIO

(1980). See generally Gregory, Police Power and the Role of the Provincial Minister of
Justice, 27 CHITTY'S L.J. 13 (1979).
195. See Ont. Stat. ch. 25, § 2, para. 4(a) (1987) (definition of "law enforcement")
and § 14(1)(a) (incorporating this definition).

196. Ont. Stat. ch. 25, §§ 2(3), 72 (1987). Letter from Joan Smith, Solicitor General, Ontario Ministry of the Soliciter General to Michael Taggart (Apr. 19, 1989) (Ontario has 120 municipal police forces).
197. Compare Ont. Stat. ch. 25, § 2, para. 3(b) with 6 ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 381, §§

2(1), 4(1), 20(1) (1980) (police force chosen as described in Revised Statutes fits within
definition of Ontario Act).

198. Ont. Stat. ch. 25, § 2, para. 3(b); see 6 ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 381, § 15 (1980).
199. Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act 1989, Ont.
Stat. (enacted 14 December 1989).

200. I R.S.C. ch. A-1, § 3; sched. 1 (1985).
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prosecutions under all federal statutes, except the Criminal Code,
throughout Canada, and enforcement of all criminal law in the Northwest and Yukon Territories. 0 1 Crown counsel attached to the Department undertake these prosecutions," 2 and hence the records will be
under the "control" of the Department 2 3 and subject to request.
A glance at the "distressingly broad" ' ' law enforcement exemptions,
however, dispels any optimism that defendants might therefore use the
AIA as a criminal discovery tool. The exemptions consist of a curious
mix of harms and class exemptions with considerable overlap and significant ambiguity.20 5 For the most part, the exemptions are permissive. 06
Section 16(1)(c) permits withholding if disclosure "could reasonably be
expected to be injurious to the enforcement of any law of Canada or a
province or the conduct of lawful investigations. 21 07 This is unobjectionable. The paragraph goes on, however, to specify three classes of information, and it is not clear whether these classes are automatically exempt or are simply illustrations of what might reasonably be regarded as
injurious to the stated interest. 20 8 The three classes of information specified are broad, particularly the third, which concerns information "obtained or prepared in the course of an investigation." 209 If courts hold
them to be class exemptions, there will be little scope for use of the AIA
as a substitute or aid to criminal discovery.
Furthermore, section 16(1)(a) overlaps with section 16(1)(c); the former provides a class exemption for any documents less than twenty years
old obtained or prepared by any government institution in the course of
lawful law enforcement activity and where the institution is designated
an investigative body by regulation. 2 0 The Access to Information Regulation 2 1' designates eight organizations as investigative bodies for this

201. The Yukon Territory has its own freedom of information statute. See supra
note 132.
202. See P.C. STENNING, supra note 145, at 157-58.
203. I R.S.C. ch. A-i, § 4(1) (1985). The act gives no definition of "control." See

Rankin, supra note 152, at 7-8.
204. Rankin, supra note 152, at 17. See also the well-directed criticisms of McCamus, Bill C-43: The Federal CanadianProposals of 1980, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIvEs, supra note 152, at 266, 287-89.
205. Rankin, supra note 152, at 17.
206.

Id.

207. I R.S.C. ch. A-I, § 16(1)(c) (1985).
208. Rankin, supra note 152, at 13.
209. I R.S.C. ch. A-I, § 16(1)(c)(iii) (1985).
210.

Id. § 16(1)(a).

211.

SOR/83-507, § 9; sched. 1 (1983), reprinted in 117 Can. Gaz. 2474, 2476-77

(June 22, 1983).
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purpose, including the RCMP. The effect is similar to that of section
14(2) of the Ontario Act, criticized above. 12
Finally, section 16(3) exempts any record containing "information obtained or prepared by the [RCMP] while performing policing services
for a province or municipality" when the province or municipality has
requested the government not to disclose such information. 13 It appears
that all eight provinces that contract the services of the RCMP as provincial police have requested confidentiality. 214 Thus the circle of protection is complete: the RCMP, acting by arrangement as provincial police
in all of the provinces except Ontario and Quebec, are not subject to
provincial FOI legislation 1 5 and are exempt from the AIA. All these
exemptions are mirrored in the companion Privacy Act 1982, which provides a code of disclosure for personal information about the requester.21 6
Under the federal legislation, an ombudsman-like Information Commissioner handles in the first instance complaints relating to nondisclosure or delay.21 7 The sketchy case summaries in the Annual Reports of
the Information Commissioner make it difficult to discern if any complaints have related to discovery-motivated requests. In one case, com-

212. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. A cabinet discussion paper by
the then Secretary of State and Minister of Communications dated June 1980 defended
class exemptions for law enforcement records on the grounds "1) that very little information... would be available under an injury test, and 2) that applying injury tests requires a great deal of time and effort of law enforcement officials[, and u]nder the burden
of work, mistakes can readily be made." Access to Information Legislation, reprinted in
THE RIGHT TO

KNow: ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENTAL PUBLICITY
327, 334-35 (D.C. Rowat 3rd ed. 1981).

AND PUBLIC

ACCESS

TO INFORMATION

213. I. R.S.C. ch. A-1, § 16(3) (1985).
214. Only Quebec and Ontario operate provincial police forces without the assistance
of the ROMP. See NATIONAL TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 35.
215. In Nova Scotia the Ombudsman under his general jurisdiction investigates com-

plaints involving the ROMP. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NOVA SCOTIA
ANNUAL REPORT 14, at 44-4 (1984) (Complaints No. 30-4, 30-7, 30-8); OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, NOVA SCOTIA ANNUAL REPORT 15, at 37 (1985) (Complaint No. 4-3).
Cf. U. LUNDVIK, THE OMBUDSMEN IN THE PROVINCES OF CANADA 87 (International
Ombudsman Institute, 1981) (indicating that provincial Ombudsmen have ceased investigating complaints against the ROMP since Re Ombudsman for Saskatchewan, 46 Dom.
L. Rep. (3d) 452 (Sask. Q.B. 1974)). The Ombudsmen have always performed a useful
role in giving complainants access to information, even prior to the enactment of FOI
legislation. See Shelton, The Ombudsman and Information, 12 ViCr. U. WELLINGTON
L. REV. 233 (1982).
216. VII R.S.C. ch. P-21, § 22 (1985).
217. See generally Ferris, Freedom of Information in Canada-TheOmbudsmanJudicial Review Model, 4 OMBUDSMAN J. 27 (1984), reprinted in 5 J. MEDIA L. &
PRAC. 193 (1984).
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plaint was made that the RCMP delayed so long in responding to a
request that the information could not be made available in time for a
court hearing.2"' Other case summaries suggest a criminal discovery motive for requests. One requester, for example, unsuccessfully sought access to reports by named RCMP officers in connection with an assault.-"" The case summaries also disclose use of the AIA in much the
same way as the United States FOIA22 0-to ferret out useful background material such as departmental directives concerning drug prosecutions 22' and customs prosecution policy documents. 22 2 A case in which
a requester gained access to all the portions of two wiretap tapes on
which his voice appeared shows that application under the Privacy Act
1982 might also prove fruitful notwithstanding the presence of identical
law enforcement exemptions.22 3
These, however, are isolated instances. All indications are that the
AIA is little used in the criminal discovery context, and the same can be
said of the provincial legislation. The real difficulty in Canada-and the
reason for the lack of impact of the federal and provincial FOI legislation on criminal discovery practice-is the extraordinary breadth of most
of the law enforcement exemptions. These exemptions are far wider than
those in the United States FOIA, for instance, and certainly are broader
than is necessary or desirable. 224 Resort to FOI laws will unlikely
achieve significant improvement in criminal discovery as of right in Canada. Future development must lie with legislation along the lines recommended by the Law Reform Commission of Canada225 or, as is more
likely, the procedural guarantees in the Charter of Rights and
226
Freedoms.

218. INFORMATION COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL REPORT 29 (1983-1984).
219. INFORMATION COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL REPORT 81 (1985-1986).
220. See Note, supra note 3, at 144-59.
221. INFORMATION COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL REPORT 20 (1984-1985).
222. Id. at 58.
223. PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1986-1987).
224. See Rankin, supra note 152.
225. See supra note 127. Usefully discussed by Ferguson, supra note 130, at 101-4
(Commission's proposals are "not an unreasonable compromise" but they do not cover
summary conviction offenses or oral unrecorded statements, are restricted to "relevant"
witness statements, and do not oblige the prosecution to disclose statements of witnesses it
does not intend to call).
226. Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. app. II, No. 44, sched. B, pt. 1 (1985). See
generally Finley, Is There Now a Constitutional Right to Discovery?, 36 Crim. Rep.
(3d) 41 (1984); Grossman, Disclosure by the Prosecution:Reconciling Duty and Discretion, 30 CRIM. L.Q. 346 (1987-1988).
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IV.
A.

THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE

Commonwealth Legislation

The Australian law and practice relating to criminal discovery appears to be as unsatisfactory as that of Canada.2 27 In contrast to the
Canadian experience, Australian lawyers from the outset were aware of
the potential of the Commonwealth Freedom of Information Act 1982 as
an aid to criminal and civil discovery. 2 8 There are quite a number of
recorded instances of discovery-motivated FOI requests.2 2 9 Evaluating
the Australian experience in a small compass is not easy, however, due
to the numerous and detailed exemptions, and the ever-growing jurisprudence interpreting the Commonwealth FOIA. The treatment here will
focus on the most relevant exemptions and major developments.2 3
The Australian Federal Police, the Director of Public Prosecutions,
the Attorney-General's Department, and the Australian Government Solicitor are all subject to the FOIA,23 l so there is little difficulty regarding
coverage.
Section 37 concerns law enforcement, and, while obviously derived
from the case law on exemption (7) of the United States FOIA, is much
broader in scope.2" 2 Section 37(1) exempts any document whose disclosure under the FOIA

227. See Elkington, Discovery Upon Indictment in New South Wales, 4 CRim. L.J. 4
(1980); Lane, Prosecutors: Non-disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence, 5 CRIM. L.J. 251
(1981); Campbell, Discovery in Committal Proceedings, 9 CRIM. L.J. 270 (1985);
Campbell, Discovery in Criminal Trials: ProsecutorialDuties and Judicial Remedies,
13 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 154 (1984); P. SALLMAN & J. WILLIS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
AUSTRALIA 77-80 (1984).
228. See, e.g., P. BAYNE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION X (1984), Dr. Geoffrey Flick

and Mr. Keith Steele, The Freedom of Information Act-An Aid to Pre-trial Discovery,
Australian Young Lawyers National Lecture Series at Sydney, (Apr. 16, 1986).
229. Instances of criminal discovery-motivated FOI requests include Re Carver and

Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 12 Admin. L. Dec. 447, 448 (Admin. App.
Trib. 1987); Austin v. Deputy Secretary, Attorney-General's Department, 67 A.L.R.

585 (Fed. Ct. 1986); see also cases cited infra at notes 314-15. Considerable use of the
Act has been made in the pre-litigation stage of civil disputes. See, e.g., Johns, Using

FOI in Defamation Litigation, 14 FREEDOM INFO. REV. 14 (1988).
230.

Thanks are due to the following people who were kind enough to provide Aus-

tralian citations and material while I was in Canada: Peter Bayne, Robin Bell, Denis
O'Brien, Joan Sheedy, and Robert Todd.

231. Freedom of Information Act 1982, [1982] 1 Austl. Acts. No. 3, §§ 4, 7; sched. 2.
232. Bayne, Exemptions Under the Freedom of Information Act 1982, 14 FED. L.
REv. 67, 88 (1983).
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would, or could reasonably be expected to(a) prejudice the conduct of an investigation of a breach, or possible
breach, of the law, or a failure, or possible failure, to comply with a law
relating to taxation or prejudice the enforcement or proper administration
of the law in a particular instance;
(b) disclose, or enable a person to ascertain, the existence or identity of
a confidential source of information in relation to the enforcement or administration of the law; or
(c) endanger the lives or physical
safety of persons engaged in or in
233
connection with law enforcement.
Subsection (2) of that section similarly protects documents the disclosure
of which "would, or could reasonably be expected to . . . prejudice the
fair trial of a person . . . [or] disclose lawful methods ... [of] preventing,
detecting [and] investigating ... evasions of the law" thereby prejudicing
234
their effectiveness.
The Federal Court considered subsection (1)(a) in the leading case of
News Corporation Ltd. v. National Companies and Securities Commission.2 a1 The National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSO)
commenced an investigation into whether News Corporation had broken
certain securities and company laws. NCSC served notices on News
Corporation to produce documents and a few weeks later announced that
it intended to hold a statutory hearing in relation to specified occurrences
involving that corporation. Shortly before that hearing, News Corporation requested under the FOIA access to almost all of the documents
obtained by NCSC (from a variety of sources) in the course of the investigation, as well as summaries, analyses, and other memoranda created
by the NCSC itself (over 6,000 documents in all). NCSC refused access
on the ground that the information was exempt under section 37(1)(a) of
the FOIA s6
Under the Australian legislation a dissatisfied requester can complain
to the federal Ombudsman or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
(AAT), but only the AAT has a binding power of decision.2 3 News
Corporation appealed to the AAT, which affirmed the NCSC's decision

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
between
in

[1982] 1 Austl. Acts No. 3, § 37(1).
Id. § 37(2).
57 A.L.R. 550 (Fed. Ct. 1984).
Id. at 552.
The administrative arrangements agreed upon to facilitate referral of matters
the Ombudsman and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) can be found

COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN AND DEFENCE FORCE OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL RE-

PORTS

1987-88, app. F, at 132-33.
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to withhold under section 37(1)(a).238 The evidence before the AAT included an affidavit by the executive director of the Commission (who was
cross-examined at the hearing) and evidence taken ex parte.2"' The affidavit evidence stated that disclosure would interfere with the investigation in at least three ways: (1) by "tipping the hand" of the NCSC and
thereby putting the people under investigation in a position to mislead or
divert the investigation either by fabricating defenses, setting false trails,
or seeking to influence witnesses; (2) by deterring witnesses from cooperating with the NCSC in the course of its investigation; and (3) by indicating the activities that were and were not subject to the investigation,
the nature and extent of the evidence gathered to date, the reliance
placed upon particular items of evidence, the direction of the investigation, the methods of surveillance used, the investigatory priorities, the
resources available, the hypotheses of investigators, and the methods of
investigation.24 °
The AAT read the word "conduct" in section 37(1)(a) to mean primarily the handling or management of the investigation. 24 ' On that basis, the AAT found the investigation would be prejudiced if disclosure
deprived the investigator of one of the techniques of inquiry, i.e., the
ability to put questions to persons who are not thoroughly prepared for
them.2 2 In the alternative, if "conduct" referred instead to the outcome
of the investigation, the AAT found prejudice in the deprivation of one
of the means of finding the facts.24 This was so even though the AAT
could not point to any person who would be likely to use the disclosed
information in order to prevent the NCSC from discovering what in fact
occurred. 4 4
News Corporation exercised its right of appeal on a question of law to
the Federal Court, arguing that disclosure would not prejudice the outcome of the investigation in this particular case because the AAT could
not point to any person who would attempt to do so. It also argued that
the words "in a particular instance" qualified each limb of section
37(1)(a), including the "investigation of a breach" part. Mr. Justice
Beaumont accepted this view as correct, saying "that the question of
prejudice under section 37(1)(a) is to be tested, not in any abstract fash238. 57 A.L.R. at 552.
239. The Federal Court held this procedure to be lawful. Id. at 582. Mr. Justice
Beaumont dissented on this point. Id. at 567.
240. Id. at 554.
241. Id. at 575 (Beaumont, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 576.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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ion, but by reference to the particular circumstances of the investigation
in hand.

24 5

For this reason, case law interpreting exemption (7)(A) of

the United States FOIA provided no assistance, for the United States
provision employs the plural form "investigations. 2 48 In contrast, Mr.
Justice Woodward did not see the need to read the words "in a particu-

2 47
"If
lar instance" as governing the earlier limbs of subsection (1)(a).

they did," he said, "they would not add to the existing requirement that
a particular breach (or possible breach) must be under investigation."" 8
The difference is probably semantic,24"9 for both judges agreed on the
requirement to focus on the consequences of disclosure in the particular
case.
Mr. Justice Woodward accepted that the statutory language required
actual prejudice to be expected, not merely the risk or possibility of
prejudice.2 50 Mr. Justice Fox shared this view. 251 Furthermore, Mr.

Justice Woodward said that reasonable expectation falls somewhere between possibility and probability, and in a general sense denotes an even
chance of prejudice occurring.252 He was satisfied that the AAT had applied the correct test, focused on the particular case, and properly found
that disclosure could reasonably be expected (on an even chance basis) to
prejudice the investigation because the applicants would be forewarned
and forearmed against questions. 25 ' The AAT was able to reach this

conclusion even though it said there was no basis in the evidence for a
245. Id. at 578 (approving the view of the AAT in Re Murtagh and Commissioner
of Taxation, 54 A.L.R. 313, 332 (1984); 6 Admin. L. Dec. 112, 129 (Admin. App. Trib.
1984) ("Regard cannot be had therefore to the possible effect of disclosure in other

cases.").
246.
247.
248.

57 A.L.R. at 578.
Id. at 561 (disapproving of the view in Re Murtagh, 54 A.L.R. 313).
Id. Accord P. BAYNE, supra note 228, at 149.
249. Bayne, Freedom of Information, in M. ARONSON & N. FRANKLIN, REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 308 (2d ed. 1987).
250. 57 A.L.R. at 561.
251. Id. at 555. In a subsequent case, Attorney-General's Department v. Cockcroft,
64 A.L.R. 97 (Fed. Ct. 1986), the Federal Court moved away from this test to one
requiring "a judgement to be made by the decision-maker as to whether it is reasonable,
as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd, or ridiculous." Id. at 106 (Bowen,
C.J. & Beaumont, J., on section 43 of the Australian Act. [1982] 1 Austl. Acts No. 3, §

43).
252. 57 A.L.R. at 562. Mr. Justice Fox refused to paraphrase the. statutory language. Id. at 555.
253. Id. at 555. See also Association of Mouth and Foot Painting Artists Pty. Ltd.
and Comm'r of Taxation, 12 FREEDOM INFO. REv. 70, 71 (Admin. App. Trib. 1987)
(case summary; deferring to claims of exemption and denying access even by counsel
based on News Corporation decision).
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positive finding that any person was presently minded to prejudice the
investigation. 2 At the end of his opinion, Mr. Justice Woodward stated
there was "ample material" to justify the AAT's findings. "
For Mr. Justice Beaumont dicta in an earlier case involving the same
parties determined the question of reasonable expectation of prejudice; in
that case, the High Court of Australia said, "[f]or an investigator to disclose his hand prematurely will not only alert the suspect to the progress
of the investigation but may well close off other sources of inquiry.""'
This reasoning indicated to Mr. Justice Beaumont the prejudice "which
could reasonably be expected in any investigation" 57 and hence in this
particular one. This is the generic approach to exemption found in
United States cases such as NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 2"
from which, ironically, Mr. Justice Beaumont had refused to derive
assistance.
Mr. Justice Fox agreed with Mr. Justice Beaumont. After accepting
that the question of prejudice had to be examined objectively in the light
of the evidence, he said:
In relation to many of the documents, it would I think take very little
evidence to justify a conclusion of reasonable expectation of prejudice. The
courts decided long ago, one imagines with little or no actual evidence of
possible prejudice to a fair trial, that an accused should not be entitled to
discovery as against the prosecution. What is sought here is analogous to
such a claim for discovery.2 59
It had not been the policy of the NCSC to give a company whose dealings were under investigation access to all documents in its possession,
and Mr. Justice Fox did not want to suggest that it should be.260 Clearly
disapproving of the applicant's use of the FOIA to whittle away the "accepted principle of non-access," Mr. Justice Fox remarked that "the application [had] all the appearance of a comprehensive fishing expedition,
likely in the immediate and ultimate consequences to hinder rather than
help the inquiry."28' 1 Similarly, Mr. Justice Woodward intimated that
applying under the FOIA, which had been "designed to advance the

254.
255.
256.
(1984)
257.

57 A.L.R. at 562.
Id.
National Co. and Securities Comm'n v. News Corp., 52 A.L.R. 417, 437
(Mason, Wilson and Dawson, JJ.).
57 A.L.R. at 578 (emphasis added).

258. 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
259. 57 A.L.R. at 555-56.
260.
261.

Id. at 557.
Id.
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principle of open government," in order to "look over" the Commission's
262
shoulder was a "misuse" of the FOIA.
The language and result in this case is strikingly similar to that in the
United States Supreme Court decision in Robbins..2" While the News
Corporation case did not raise the issue of the FOIA's impact on criminal discovery, the Federal Court's reasoning indicates clearly that it will
not warmly embrace the idea. Similarly, the AAT jurisprudence is
against use of the FOIA as a substitute or aid to discovery. As in the
United States, attempted use of FOI legislation to aid discovery in tax
adjudication has been to the fore.
In Re Murtagh and Commissioner of Taxation,264 the applicant, who
had appealed to the Taxation Board of Review against an adverse determination by the Commissioner, sought access under the FOIA to documents in the possession of the Commissioner relating to her tax returns.
Relying on several exemptions, the Commissioner refused to disclose all
the documents. 65 One of the major arguments the Commissioner raised
before the AAT upon appeal regarding several of the exemptions was
that access under the FOIA would subvert discovery rules if the dispute
reached the Supreme Court on further appeal from the Taxation Board
of Review.2 6' The Commissioner first raised this argument (inappropriately so the AAT thought)2 67 in relation to section 36, which generally
protects from disclosure documents relating to policy-forming processes
unless the public interest dictates disclosure. The AAT rejected the Commissioner's submission for the simple reasons that the Taxation Board of
Review had no discovery rules and that no proceeding was presently
before any court of law. The AAT did say, however:
If there were proceedings before a State Supreme court, it would be
proper to give consideration as to whether, in the public interest, the grant
of access to documents should be left to the decision of the court, it having
adequate powers to order disclosure if, having regard to the justice of the
case, it considered that disclosure to be appropriate. 2 8

262. Id. at 565.
263. 437 U.S. 214 (1978). The News Corporationcase vindicates Peter Bayne's view
that the reasoning in Robbins seems equally applicable to the Australian Act. P. BAYNE,
supra note 228, at 153.
264. 54 A.L.R. 313; 6 Admin L. Dec. 112 (Admin. App. Trib. 1984) (Davies, J.,
President, Sir Ernest Coates, R.A. Sinclair).
265. Id. at 319-26, 6 Admin. L. Dec. at 118-24.
266. Id. at 326, 6 Admin. L. Dec. at 124.
267. Id. at 327, 6 Admin. L. Dec. at 124 (thought more appropriate under [1982] 1
Austl. Acts. No. 3, § 37(1)(a) (prejudice of law enforcement)).
268. Id., 6 Admin. L. Dec. at 124-25.

1990]

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LEGISLATION

A more relevant question under section 36, the AAT thought, was
"whether it is injurious to the public interest to reveal documents to a
taxpayer which include details of the evidence... and the witnesses" to
be called before the Taxation Board of Review. 269 That question did not
arise for answer in this case, as none of the documents contained such
information or indeed any information likely to prejudice the Commissioner's case before the Board. °
These observations regarding the public interest factors germane to
section 36(2) applied directly to the section 37(1)(a) exemption claim as
well. The granting of access would not hinder the Commissioner in
presenting his case or unfairly assist the case of the applicant. "The documents in issue," the AAT observed, "do not disclose names of witnesses
or statements of witnesses or the like. Nor would the grant of access
subvert the application of discovery rules in the Taxation Board of Review proceedings."127' The AAT left little doubt as to its attitude if the
documents sought before adjudication had disclosed the names of witnesses or their statements.
The only other case bearing directly on this issue, Re Kingston Thoroughbred Horse Stud and Australian Taxation Office, 72 involved an
FOI request for documents while the relevant dispute was before a court
of law. The applicant lodged appeals from adverse determinations by the
Commissioner of Taxation in the Supreme Court of New South Wales,
but at the time of the AAT hearing the Supreme Court had not dealt
with the appeals, and the applicants had not sought discovery, although
particulars had been sought and supplied, as well as lengthy affidavits
filed by the applicants.27 3 The Commissioner sought an indefinite adjournment of the AAT hearing until the Supreme Court matter had been
determined in order to prevent prejudice to those proceedings.27 4 Further, the requests were said to amount to a "fishing expedition" that
would not be permitted under the High Court Rules concerning discovery and inspection.27 Counsel for the applicants opposed the adjourn-

269. Id., 6 Admin. L. Dec. at 125.
270. Id., 6 Admin. L. Dec. at 125.
271. Id. at 332, 6 Admin. L. Dec. at 129.
272. 10 Admin. L. Notes N38 (Admin. App. Trib. 1986) (Hon. Sir William Prentice (Senior Member), Dr. A.P. Renouf). See also the fleeting references to discovery in
Re Bartlett and Dep't of Prime Minister, 12 Admin. L. Dec. 659 (Admin. App. Trib.
1987); Re N. MacDonald Pty. and Dep't of Territories and Local Gov't, 9 Admin. L.
Dec. 236, 242 (Admin. App. Trib. 1985).
273. 10 Admin. L. Notes at N39.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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ment, submitting that the FOIA provided new rights for citizens unqualified by reference to time, circumstances, or motivation, and that there
was no room for circumscribing requests by reference to the well-established legal aversion to fishing expeditions."7 8 The AAT decided to continue the hearing and rule on an adjournment at the end. The AAT did
not have to rule on adjournment, however, as it held most of the documents to be exempt from disclosure.2 7
Responding to the subversion of discovery argument in the context of
section 37(1)(a), the AAT had regard to the view of Mr. Justice Davies,
sitting as President of the AAT in another case, that "[a]n Administrative Tribunal should not act in such a manner as to prejudice the conduct of proceedings which are on foot before a court of law."2 7 The
AAT concluded that "there could be a real chance that prejudice to the
conduct of legal proceedings might result were this Administrative Tribunal to direct that disclosure should be made of documents many of
which could well be refused to [sic] discovery in the Supreme Court. '2 79
The AAT found the additional fact that release under the FOIA is release to the world to support exemption under sections 37(1)(a) and
40(1)(d) 280 in that release would show the extent and nature of the

276. Id.
277. Id. at N39-N40.
278. Id. at N39, citing Re Lane and Conservator of Wildlife, 5 Admin. L. Notes
N429, N430 (Admin. App. Trib. 1984). The AAT also made reference to comments by
Deputy President Todd in Re Lander and Aust'l Taxation Office, A83/111 (1985)
(summarized at 9 Admin. L. Notes N25 (1985)). 10 Admin. L. Notes at N40. In that
case an appeal was lodged with the Supreme Court from an adverse decision of the
Taxation Board of Review while a FOI dispute was progressing towards an AAT hearing. The Supreme Court hearing was disposed of before the AAT hearing, but Deputy
President Todd said, "the material here in question would clearly have been exempt
prior to the disposal of the proceedings before the Board of Review and the Supreme
Court under s.37(1)(a), which it is conceded does not now apply." Lander, supra, at 89.
279. Re Kingston Thoroughbred Horse Stud and Aust'l Tax Office, 10 Admin. L.
Notes N38, N40 (Admin. App. Trib. 1986). The Victorian AAT expressed similar sentiments in Soo Lin Seng and Vict. Police, 17 FREEDOM INFO. RIv. 9 (Admin. App. Trib.
1988) (Rowlands, J., President).
280. [1982] 1 Austl. Acts No. 3, §§ 37(1)(a), 40(1)(d). This provision exempts documents whose disclosure would or could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of an agency. Bayne has
described the provision as "something of a fall-back or a 'standby' [exemption] to be
invoked in every case" and notes that the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs has recommended its repeal. Bayne, Freedom of Information: Democracy and the Protection of the Processes and Decisions of Government, 62 AUSTL.
L.J. 538, 541 (1988).
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Commissioner's investigations and alert others suspected of tax evasion.
The AAT's evident desire in this case to avoid potential conflict with
the courts is understandable,"' 1 particularly given the peculiar position of
the AAT on the federal adjudicatory landscape. For constitutional reasons, the AAT had to be established as a nonjudicial body, but it has a
Federal Court Judge as President and is subject to the appellate supervi28 2
sion of the Federal Court.
While this may explain the AAT's reticence in the face of court proceedings, it cannot justify in law the position taken in the Kingston case.
To interpret and apply the exemptions so as to exclude those engaged in
litigation as a class from the benefits of the FOIA, as this panel of the
AAT appears to do, is to ignore the statutory directive to focus on
prejudice in the particular case. The AAT made no visible attempt to
consider prejudice in its decision. Nor did it explain how disclosure
under the FOIA could be greater than that through civil discovery. The
AAT appeared simply to assume that disclosure under the FOIA might
be broader than by way of civil discovery and that this would prejudice
the administration of justice. The AAT's position would be justifiable if
it had found that a document privileged from discovery would be disclosable under the FOIA but for section 37(1)(a), but the reasons for the
decision do not support that conclusion. 8 Rather, the AAT appeared to
assume prejudice simply because the FOIA provides an alternative disclosure mechanism to that in the Supreme Court Rules. That is not only
simplistic but also legally wrong.
While both the FOI and civil discovery regimes permit disclosure of
information, it is important to understand that each has a different function. The FOIA provides for disclosure of information about the workings of government to the general public in order to further democratic
ideals.2"' Civil discovery, on the other hand, is designed to narrow and
clarify the issues in litigation and to ascertain the facts relevant to those

281. The Ombudsmen employ similar avoidance techniques on occasion. See Taggart, Courts, Ombudsmen and Freedom of Information: The Empire Strikes Back, 20
Vicr. U. WELLINGTON L.R. MONOGRAPH 2 1, 33 (1990).
282. See generally Flick, Commentary, 12 FED. L. REv. 65 (1981); Campbell, The
Choice Between Judicial and Administrative Tribunals and the Separation of Powers,
12 FED. L. REv. 64 (1981).
283. Contra Forgie, Freedom of Information Act 1982: An Introduction to the Act,
Its Relevance and Effectiveness and the Role of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal,
1988 QUEENSL. L. Soc'Y J. 199, 214, 217.
284. See [1982] 1 Austl. Acts No. 3, § 3 ("The object of this Act is to extend as far
as possible the right of the Australian community to access to information in the possession of the Government .... ).
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issues, thereby avoiding surprise at trial and facilitating speedy resolution of disputes. As Tomlinson has remarked, civil discovery "is not
designed to provide the parties with the

. . .

minimum access to govern-

ment records that is available under the FOIA, and even the most generous rules of discovery do not always provide that level of access." 28
Thus "fishing" is not permitted in a discovery regime bounded by need
and relevance requirements, but "fishing" is no ground for objection to
an FOI request. " 6
The FOIA requires the AAT to look for real prejudice (actual or reasonably expected) to the administration of justice by disclosure in the
particular case and not to assume prejudice because the FOIA appears to
cut across the settled civil discovery regime established by the 'superior'
courts. Furthermore, to apply the exemptions in section 37 in the way
the AAT appeared to in the Kingston case is to do something the Senate
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs refused to do,
namely to limit use of the FOIA by litigants as a class.287
The Kingston case concerned civil discovery, which is governed by detailed provisions in the State Supreme Court Rules. This is not the case
with criminal discovery, where, by and large, the rules and discretions
derive from the common law and the customs and practices of the profession over time. They do not form a "code" susceptible to subversion in
the same way that Supreme Court Rules for civil discovery supposedly
are subverted. Civil discovery developed out of chancery practice and has
evolved into a sophisticated code of practice.2"' The development of criminal discovery is severely retarded in comparison, and, as Sallman and
Willis note, "[t]he whole subject has received only cursory, and almost
derisory, attention in Australia." 9 But despite these important differences between criminal and civil discovery, the reasoning and approaches
in the case law on section 37(1)(a) involving civil and administrative discovery point towards criminal discovery being treated no differently.
Other exemptions in the FOIA may also frustrate attempts to use it as
a criminal discovery tool. The protection of documents subject to legal
professional privilege in section 42 may operate on occasion as a significant barrier to criminal discovery-motivated FOI requests.290 In Austin
285. Tomlinson, supra note 44, at 121 (discussing freedom of information and civil
discovery in the United States).
286. Infra note 307.
287. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
288. See generally Goldstein, A Short History of Discovery, 10 ANGLo-AM. L. REv.
257 (1981).
289.

P. SALLMAN & J. Wiras, supra note 227, at 80.

290. [1982] 1 Aust. Acts. No. 3, § 42.
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v. Deputy Secretary, Attorney-General's Dept., Austin, who had been
charged with sending an explosive substance through the mail contrary
to the postal legislation, sought access under the FOIA to the file of the
Australian Government Solicitor, who had carriage of the prosecution. 291
The Government Solicitor withheld several documents, most on the
ground of legal professional privilege, and the AAT upheld that decision.2 92 Upon further appeal, the Federal Court found no error of law
on the AAT's part."98
In another case, the AAT upheld a claim for exemption under section
42, protecting from disclosure the statements of potential witnesses taken
by police officers in the course of a criminal investigation and procured
294
for the sole purpose of obtaining legal advice.
Of the other exemptions, particularly relevant are sections 40(a) (substantial adverse effect on proper and efficient conduct of agency operations), 41(1) (protection of personal privacy of others against unreasonable disclosure), and 36(1) (protection of deliberative policy-forming
processes). '95 Unlike the law enforcement and legal professional privilege
exemptions, all of these sections provide for some sort of public interest
balancing to determine disclosure or withholding. Under section 40 an
applicant can override the exemption simply if disclosure would, on balance, be in the public interest, 9' whereas in section 36 the exemption
will apply only if the decision-maker shows that disclosure would be
contrary to the public interest. ' In the personal privacy exemption, the
words "unreasonable disclosure" demand consideration of the public
interest.2 98

In considering the public interest in these exemptions, of what relevance is a requester's litigation-generated need for the documents? The
better view is that a litigant-requester has no better claim under the
FOIA than any other member of the public and that litigation-generated
need should count neither for nor against disclosure in weighing the
public interest factors.2'99 This approach is at odds with a considerable
291. 67 A.L.R. 585 (Fed. Ct. 1986).
292. Id. at 586.
293. Id. at 586, 590.
294. John and Secretary, Attorney-General's Department, 4 FREEDOM INFO. REv.
54 (Admin. App. Trib. 1986) (Deputy President R.C. Jennings Q.C.).
295. [1982] 1 Austl. Acts. No. 3, §§ 40(1)(a), 41(1), 36(1).
296. Id. at § 40.

297. Id. § 36(1)(b).
298. Id. § 41(1).
299. See P. BAYNE, supra note 228, at 158; Re Colonial Mutual Life Assurance
Soc'y Ltd. and Dep't of Resources and Energy, 12 Admin. L. Dec. 251, 253 (Admin.
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amount of AAT jurisprudence that has focused on the personal interest
of the requester as an aspect of the public interest, but there are recent
signs of a change in approach."' 0
The Commonwealth Ombudsman noted in 1985 that some lawyers
have used the FOIA to complement the "well trodden 'legal' paths to
discovery." 3 01 While the reaction of the agencies was to expect FOI access "to take second place to traditional 'legal' procedures," the
Ombudsman pointed out:
In fact there is no statute, judgment or rule which says this should be so.
While the release of documents may be denied under the FOI Act for
reasons such as adverse effect upon enforcement of the law or the existence of legal professional privilege, the FOI Act does not authorise deferral of an FOI access decision pending a litigation outcome, nor is it possible to deny access simply because the applicant in a separate capacity as a
litigant is elsewhere following another set of rules governing access.302
The Ombudsman spoke of discovery-motivated FOI requests as a "tactical ploy,"303 but others have labeled them an abuse of the FOIA. For
instance, in his personal submissions to the Senate Standing Committee
on Constitutional and Legal Affairs reviewing the FOIA, Dr. Gavan
Griffith, Solicitor General of Australia, argued that the use of the FOIA
as an aid to discovery created serious delay and enabled litigants to engage in wide-ranging fishing expeditions contrary to the Court Rules. 304
Dr. Griffith urged the Senate Standing Committee to recommend
amendment of the FOIA so that it would not trespass upon the course of

App. Trib. 1987); Re Anderson and Austl. Fed' Police, 11 Admin. L. Dec. 355 (Admin.
App. Trib. 1986); News Corp. v. National Co. and Securities Comm'n, 57 A.L.R. 550,
559 (Fed. Ct. 1984). In contrast, in civil discovery, very generally speaking, the greater
the need of the litigant for the document, the more likely that the other side will be
obliged to disclose it.
300. See Bayne, supra note 280, at 542 (citing cases).
301.

COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN AND DEFENCE FORCE OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL

1984-85, PARL. PAP. No. 485/1985, at 173 [hereinafter OMBUDSMAN 84-85].
A nearly identical statement can be found in the Ombudsman's submission to the Senate
REPORTS

Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs review of the FOIA. See COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN AND DEFENCE FORCE OMBUDSMAN,
1986-87, PARL. PAP. No. 427/1987, app. G, at 157.
302. OMBUDSMAN 84-85, supra note 301, at 173.

ANNUAL

REPORTS

303. Id.
304. See Freedom of Information Act 1982: Report on the Operationand Administration of the Freedom of Information Legislation, by the Senate Standing Comm. on
Legal and ConstitutionalAffairs 52-53, paras. 3.61-3.63 (Dec. 1987) (statement of Solicitor General Griffith).
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anticipated or current legal proceedings.80 5 He was not alone in that
call .30 The submission by the Attorney-General's Department summarized the arguments for and against closing FOI access to litigants, saying there is "much to be said" for limiting FOI access. 30 7 The Senate
Standing Committee in its published Report refused to take up these

305. Id.
306. Id. at 53 n.48 (reference to evidence and submissions from the Australian Taxation Office, and submissions from the Australian Customs Service and the Aboriginal
Development Commission).
307. The submission of the Attorney General's Department to the Senate Standing
Committee's Review of the FOIA dated June 1986) said this:
There are policy arguments for and against the appropriateness of FOI access
being permitted in parallel with discovery for those purposes. The main arguments
given in favour include:
FOI policy is predicated on a public interest in individuals having access to Government documents, regardless of their reason for wanting access, subject to certain
essential exemptions. It follows that, for a greater public good, the Commonwealth
may be required under the Act to release information which may be politically or
administratively embarrassing, or provide evidence which may be used against it in
legal proceedings, or otherwise be inimical to its direct interest. To prevent or
postpone that release simply because litigation is contemplated or commenced
would undermine that policy.
0 To apply the "no fishing" rule of discovery to FOI would run counter to the
principle that an FOI applicant need [not] demonstrate interest or standing to
justify his or her request and also contrary to the right to unilaterally determine
the ambit of relevance by the terms of a request.
: FOI proceedings need not interfere with proper judicial timetabling and management of procedures. If a litigant seeks an extension of time for taking a step in
the proceedings because an FOI application is pending, it is a matter for the court
whether to grant that extension of time. The court retains control. The court retains its powers to limit the matters in issue and is not bound to delay proceedings
while FOI requests are outstanding. Should FOI disclosure prejudice proper administration of the law within the meaning of s.37, then that section provide[s] a
remedy. Should FOI disclosure amount to a contempt of court, s.46 is available; if
disclosure ought properly to be deferred, s.21(l)(c) is available.
The main arguments given against include:
* Once parties are in litigation their access to relevant documents should fall to be
determined by the rules of court.
a Where a litigant engages in concurrent FOI proceedings against an agency in
respect of documents relevant to the litigation, there is a practical difficulty for the
agency of dealing with the litigant on two separate fronts. To permit concurrent
FOI and discovery proceedings in respect of the same documents can lead to confusing and parallel actions in the AAT and the court in which the litigation is
pending. There is therefore much to be said for the view that a litigant ought not
to be permitted to use the FOI Act to seek access to documents which are the
subject of procedures available in the litigation.
Id. at 58-60, paras. 3.12-3.12.17.
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invitations for reasons of both principle and practicality:
The Committee does not recommend that any amendments be made to the
FOI Act to prevent FOI access being used to supplement the discovery
process. In principle, the Committee does not regard this use of FOI as
inappropriate. The fact that a court or tribunal is not the exclusive arbiter
of the disclosure of documents by one or other of the parties does not mean
that it necessarily loses control over the litigation process. It retains complete control over the use of documents, however obtained, as well as over
its time-tabling and the management of its procedures. A court or tribunal
is not obliged to delay proceedings in a matter because an FOI request is
, outstanding .... Apart from the question of principle, the Committee sees
insurmountable difficulties inherent in any attempt to devise a provision to
prevent litigants, or people acting on behalf of litigants, obtaining documents relevant to that litigation under the FOI Act.308
B.

State Legislation

The only Australian state to enact FOI legislation to date is Victoria.30 9 The Freedom of Information Act 1982 resembles closely the Commonwealth legislation, upon which it was modeled, although some of its
exemptions are more restrictive.310 The Victorian Act covers the state
police force311 and until recently all the prosecuting authorities as
well. 12 Several cases have involved attempted access to police records.
On October 13, 1987, the Victorian Government promulgated the Freedom of Information (Exempt Offices) Regulations 1987, which exempted
from the operation of the Victorian Act the offices of the Solicitor General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Victorian Government Solicitor, and the Police Complaints Authority.3 1
308. Id. at 53, paras. 3.64-3.65. The practical difficulties outlined by the Senate
Standing Committee, id. at 53-54, paras. 3.64-3.65, echo the conclusions in Tomlinson's
study in the United States context. See supra note 44.
309. Freedom of Information Act,1982, Vict. Acts No. 9859. At the time of writing,
a Freedom of Information Bill had been introduced into the New South Wales legislature. See 16 FREEDOM INFO. REV. 40 (1988).
310. See generally Proust, Exemptions Under the Victorian Freedom of Information
Act 1982, 14 FED. L. REV. 143 (1983-1984).
311. Vict. Acts No. 9859, § 5(4). Note, however, that documents created by the Bureau of Criminal Investigation are exempt from disclosure. Id. § 31(3).
312. The Director of Public Prosecutions was covered, as were police prosecutors.
See infra note 313. On criminal prosecutions by police in Australia, see generally P.
SALLMAN & J. WILLIS, supra note 227, at 49-53, 71-74.
313. Freedom of Information (Exempt Offices) Regulations 1987, Stat. Regs 1987,
No. 266, reg. 5.
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In the early days of the operation of the Victorian Act, when the appeals jurisdiction was temporarily reposed in the Victorian County
Court pending establishment of the Victorian Administrative Appeals
Tribunal (AAT), that court reportedly upheld a refusal by the Ministry
of Police and Emergency Services to release a "police brier' relating to a
charge against the requester under section 31 (which corresponds
broadly to section 37 of the Commonwealth Act).3 1' Confirmation of this
approach is found in a recent decision of the Victorian AAT in Stewart
and Victoria Police.15 Then President Judge Rowlands, himself a
County Court Judge, presided over this panel of the AAT.
The applicants in Stewart were arrested following a demonstration
and were subsequently charged and committed for trial. Following their
arrest, they lodged complaints alleging assault against the police officers.
After an internal police investigation the complaints were rejected. The
applicants sought access to the evidence gathered in the course of the
internal investigation. The police refused to disclose this information on
several grounds, all of which the AAT upheld on appeal.3"'
The AAT was satisfied that the police gathered the evidence on the
basis that in the event charges of assault were not laid against police
officers the statements would remain confidential. Disclosure of this confidential information was held to be "contrary to the public interest," '
as witnesses would likely be less full and frank in providing information
in the future if it were disclosed. 8' The possibility of harassment of civilian witnesses if the statements were released also influenced the
AAT.3 19 Furthermore, the AAT felt that the content of the witness statements related to the personal affairs of the witnesses, and disclosure
would be "unreasonable" in terms of the personal privacy exemption. 20
Finally, the Victorian AAT upheld reliance on the law enforcement exemption, 21 which is similar to section 37(1)(a) of the Commonwealth
FOIA. 22 The AAT observed:

314. Gordon v. Ministry of Police and Emergency Services, (Vict. County Ct., Oct.
17, 1984, noted by Paterson, All Care and No Responsibility-The County Court's Interim Custody of FOI, 59 LAW INST. J. 439, 441 (1985)).
315. See 15 FREEDOM INFO. REv. 27 (Vict. Admin. App. Trib. 1988). The facts and
quote in the text are taken from this report.
316. Id. at 27.
317. Vict. Acts No. 9859, § 35(1) (b).
318. 15 FREEDOM INFO. REV. at 27.

319. Id.
320.
321.
322.

Id.; see Vict. Acts No. 9859, § 33.
15 FREEDOM INFO. REV. at 27; see Vict. Acts No. 9859, § 31(1)(a).
Quoted supra in text at note 233. See also Soo Lin Seng and Victoria Police, 17
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Insofar as material is sought which may be relevant to the future court
hearing against the applicants we are of the view that the whole area of
"criminal discovery" should, as a matter of policy remain with the criminal courts. The concept itself is poorly developed and its relationship with
the Freedom of Information Act is ill defined. 23
This is essentially an assertion that it is contrary to the public interest to
apply the FOIA according to its terms. But, as Deputy President Todd
of the Commonwealth AAT said in response to such a claim in a different context, "[iut is a cri de coeur which, however understandable, runs
completely contrary to the spirit and intendment of the FOI Act .... 1,,24
Page and Metropolitan Transit Authority2 5 shows the potential of
other exemptions in the Victorian Act to deflect discovery-motivated FOI
requests. Page, who was involved in an accident with a train, sought
access under the FOIA to an accident report prepared by transit employees and submitted to the Authority's legal advisor. The Authority disclosed most of the report but refused to release the section giving the
names and addresses of witnesses to the accident. 26 The Victorian AAT
found that a person's name and address related to his personal affairs,
and so the question was whether disclosure of this information would be
"unreasonable." ' 27 After considering a number of factors, including the
interest the requester had in the information and the likelihood that the
witnesses would not wish to be identified, the AAT found disclosure
would not be unreasonable under section 33.8' But the AAT upheld the
claim of legal professional privilege under section 32.29 Unlike the
Commonwealth AAT, the Victorian AAT has the power (subject to certain exemptions) to order the release of exempt documents.3 3 The applicant argued under this provision, section 50(4), that disclosure would
facilitate a speedy and just resolution of the civil litigation arising from

FREEDOM INFO. REV. 9 (Admin. App. Trib. 1988).

323. 15 FREEDOM INFO. REv. at 27.
324. Re Bartlett and Dep't of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 12 Admin. L. Dec. 659,
663 (Admin. App. Trib. 1987).
325. 15 FREEDOM INFO. REV. at 28. The facts are taken from this report.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Vict. Acts No. 9859, § 50(4). For an instance in which the Victorian AAT
exercised its discretion under section 50(4) to release documents properly the subject of
legal professional privilege, see Chadwick and Dep't of Property and Services, 10 FREEDOM INFO. REV. 40 (Vict. Admin. App. Trib. 1987)(Rowlands, J., President).
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the accident."' 1 The AAT did not accept this as justifying release, pointing out that the FOI request was essentially an attempt to extract privileged documents from a governmental litigant that would not otherwise
have to be disclosed by a nongovernmental litigant."3 2 Thus, the use of
the Victorian Act in Page as a prelitigation civil discovery tool was
unsuccessful.
The Commonwealth and Victorian experience with FOI legislation in
the criminal discovery context parallels to a remarkable degree the
United States experience. But in spurning FOIA-driven discovery, the
United States courts at least have available the limited but specific provision for criminal discovery in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
whereas in Australia the courts, by rejecting discovery-motivated FOI
access, are thrown back onto the discretion-ridden and uncertain common law and practice. Whether or not this suits the judiciary, who
thereby retain the last discretionary say on discovery matters, it is hardly
in the public interest. 3 '
V.

THE NEw ZEALAND EXPERIMENT

The common law backdrop to criminal discovery in New Zealand is
identical to that in Australia and Canada. 4 Long on prosecutorial discretion and short on legally enforceable rights of access, New Zealand
common law allows for considerable variation in disclosure practices,
which frequently depend on relations between the prosecutor and defense counsel involved. 35 As in Canada, the issue of criminal discovery
has been the subject of a recent law reform study in New Zealand,3
337
and there seemed every prospect of legislative action on the subject.
Before that came to pass, however, a case before the New Zealand Court
of Appeal raised for decision the impact of New Zealand's FOI statute
on the practice of criminal discovery. 8 '

331.
332.

Id.

15 FREEDOM INFO. REV. at 28.

333.

See Louisell, supra note 13, at 98.

334.

See Penlington, Our Criminal Procedure-A Pleafor Reform, 6

OTAGO

L.

REv. 1 (1985); Doyle, Criminal Discovery in New Zealand, 7 N.Z. U. L. REv. 23

(1976).
335. See M. STACE, DISCLOSURE AND CRIMINAL DIscovERY (1985).
336. CRIMINAL LAw REFORM COMM., supra note 128.
337.

See 1986 N.Z. PARL. DEB. 2168-69 (1986) (Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, Minis-

ter of Justice); 1986 N.Z. PARL. DEB. 5893 (1986) (Mr. Bill Dillon); Rt. Hon. Geoffrey
Palmer, The Official Information Amendment Bill: Disclosure in Criminal Cases and
the Ministerial Veto, Speech Given Before the Rotary Club of Hutt (Nov. 5, 1986).
338. Commissioner of Police v. Ombudsman, [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (C.A.).
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Before analysing that decision, a few introductory points need to be
made. First, New Zealand's freedom of information statute, the Official
Information Act 1982 (OIA), 3 9 differs in some respects from the federal
Canadian and Australian FOI legislation, which are based more
squarely on the United States FOIA model." ° Most relevantly, the OIA
distinguishes between "official" and "personal" information," 1 the latter
being "information" held by a subject agency "about" the requester and
to which that person has a legal right of access." 2 In the Ombudsman
case, the requester sought access to "personal" information held by the
police. Second, as far as coverage is concerned, the OIA applies to the
police and the Crown Law Office.""3 The latter is independent of the
Department of Justice and undertakes the legal work of the Crown. The
Office is situated only in the capital city, Wellington, and outside that
region the legal business of the Crown (mainly criminal prosecutions) is
contracted out to senior lawyers in various parts of the country. Crown
counsel employed by the Crown Law Office who conduct criminal prosecutions will be subject to pretrial OIA requests. But the OIA does not
make clear whether it covers those local prosecutors, known as Crown
Solicitors, to whom the criminal prosecution work is contracted out.
Crown Solicitors hold warrants of appointment from the Governor-General, who according to constitutional convention follows the advice of his
Ministers. 4 4 One cannot easily say that a Crown Solicitor is "engaged
by any Department or Minister," as the appointment is by the
Crown. 45 Of course this would be highly anomalous given the inclusion
of the Crown Law Office under the OIA, but as noted above a similar
problem exists in Ontario. a" In New Zealand the OIA expressly covers
the police force, and so at worst the consequence of not covering Crown
Solicitors will be the inconvenience of addressing criminal discovery-mo339. 1982 N.Z. Stat. No. 156.
340. See generally Taggart, Freedom of Information in New Zealand, in
AccEss

TO GOVERNMENT-HELD

INFORMATION:

PUBUC

A COMPARATIVE SYMPOSIUM

211

(N.S. Marsh ed. 1987). Compare the contributions in that volume on the federal Australian, Canadian, and United States legislation.
341. It is not necessary here to detail the significance of the distinction in the statutory scheme as a whole. On this, see Taggart, Freedom of Information and the University, 6 OTAGO L. REV. 638, 654-56 (1988).

342. 1982 N.Z. Stat. No. 156, § 24. Id. § 2 (definition of "personal information").
The OIA is unique in making "information," rather than documents, the subject matter
of access. This raises its own problems, see Taggart, supra note 341, at 639-41.
343. 1992 N.Z. Stat. No. 156, § 2 (definitions of "department" and "organisation").
344. The Crown Solicitors Regulations 1987, Stat. Rules 1987, No. 58, reg. 2.
345. 1982 N.Z. Stat. No. 156, § 2(5).
346. Supra notes 185-90.
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tivated OIA requests to the police rather than the Crown Solicitor in
some types of trials.

47

Finally, New Zealand's law of criminal procedure-in common with
practice in Australia, Canada, and to some extent the United
States-draws a distinction between offenses tried summarily and those
tried on indictment. The former are tried by a District Court judge alone
without a jury. The latter offenses are tried before a District or High
Court judge and jury after a preliminary or depositions hearing before a
District Court judge designed to determine whether a prima facie case
has been made out to commit the accused to trial by jury. At the preliminary hearing the prosecution presents its case by calling intended trial
witnesses, their statements (called depositions) are recorded in open
court, and the witnesses are available for cross-examination by the defense."' If the District Court judge decides the prosecution has made out
a prima facie case, the accused is committed for jury trial, and the defense has available the depositions in order to prepare for trial. In this
way the preliminary or depositions hearing operates as an avenue of
criminal discovery for the defense. But the preliminary hearing is available only in a tiny fraction of cases because the vast majority of offenses
are proceeded with summarily. The New Zealand Department of Justice figures for the year ending March 1989 show the number of jury
trials as 1,606, compared with 189, 648 summary trials 4 9-1ess than one
percent of the latter.
In Commissioner of Police v Ombudsman,3 50 one Pearce, involved in a
gang-related altercation with the police, was charged with the summary
offenses of obstructing the police, drunk driving, refusing to accompany a
police officer, and driving without a license. Before trial defense counsel

347. In New Zealand a specially trained corps of police officers prosecutes all summary offenses and usually conducts the preliminary hearing of offenses charged indictably. Crown prosecutors usually only appear at jury trial.
348. For discussion of the preliminary hearing in New Zealand criminal procedure,
see Savage, Criminal Procedure: The Effect of Procedure Upon Justice, in ESSAYS ON
CRIMINAL LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 94 (R.S. Clark ed. 1971).
349. REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH

1989, at 20-21. This figure for summary cases excludes traffic offenses, which in the
relevant period numbered 228, 265. Id. at 20.
350. [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 578 (H.C.). The police also relied on section 9(2)(k) (which
prevents the disclosure of official information for improper gain or advantage), but the
Chief Ombudsman, the High Court, and the Court of Appeal were unanimous in holding that exemption inapplicable to "personal" information. Id. at 581. See also FIFTH
COMPENDIUM OF CASE NOTES OF THE OMBUDSMEN 12, 15 (1984) [hereinafter FIRTH
COMPENDIUM]

(G.R. Laking, Chief Ombudsman); Ombudsman, [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R.

286, 396 (Cooke, P.), 402-3 (McMullin, J.). See also 1982 N.Z. Stat. No. 156, § 27(1A)
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sought access under the OIA to briefs of evidence of witnesses proposed
to be called at trial and held by the police. The police refused to disclose
this information, arguing that it was exempt from disclosure by virtue of
section 6(c) of the OIA.3 ' That exemption provides:
Good reason for withholding official information exists ...

if the making

available of that information would be likely(c) To prejudice the maintenance of the law, including the prevention,
investigation, and detection of offences, and the right to a fair trial .... 31,
Under the OIA, the dissatisfied requester of personal information can
complain to the Ombudsman, who will investigate under the
Ombudsmen legislation, or the requester can go directly to court to have
the claimed legal right determined.3 53 Pearce elected to complain to the
Ombudsman. The police raised before the Ombudsman the following objections to supplying the requested information:
(i) "fair" [trial] means fair to both parties.
(ii) The basic rule of justice is that both parties to litigation should be in
the same position as regards the trial. The Crown is under various disabilities in criminal prosecutions: it has the onus of proof and there are
various statutory provisions which are designed to assist the defendant, but
in the absence of clear statutory authority, no further forensic disadvantage is justified.
(iii) The proposition being considered lacks reciprocity and thus is plainly
unfair.
(iv) If the Crown is placed in a position of further forensic disadvantage,
the guilty are more likely than ever to be acquitted.
(v) If briefs of evidence in summary cases are to be released to the defence,
then it is likely that more resources than are strictly justified will be expended in the preparation of such documents, thus diverting Police resources from more direct maintenance of the law.
(vi) The Police may be forced into some other procedure for appraising
prosecutors of the evidence to be given, thus rendering less effective their
prosecutions and making the acquittal of those who have committed offences more likely.
(vii) The very nature of summary prosecution is that it is without interlocutory steps; to take away this defining characteristic will be to impede
the enforcement of law and the administration of justice will be made
as amended 1987 N.Z. Stat. No. 8, § 15.

351. Ombudsman, [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 579.
352.

1982 N.Z. Stat. No. 156, § 6(c).

353. See id. § 35; Commissioner of Police v. Ombudsman, [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 38990 (Cooke, P.).
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more burdensome.
(viii) In certain circumstances the provision to the defence of a brief of
evidence by a civilian witness may encourage a defendant (or his associates) to try and interfere with that witness; this is not so likely in the case
of a deposition since on making the deposition the witness becomes committed to the evidence which he has given. (Indeed it will generally be
admissible at trial if he becomes unavailable to give evidence). In the case
of a mere brief, job sheet or statement, the witness may be more amenable
to pressure.
(ix) Certain defendants may be tempted to manufacture evidence to meet
the prosecution evidence.'"
The then Chief Ombudsman, Mr. (now Sir) George Lakiig, rejected
these objections and concluded the police had not established that disclosing the briefs of evidence in this particular case would likely prejudice
the interests in section 6(c).3 55 The Chief Ombudsman formally recommended that the police disclose the briefs of evidence. This is the extent
of the Ombudsman's power under part IV of the OIA, which confers a
legal right of access to "personal" information. 356 Although departments
follow formal recommendations in the vast majority of cases-one figure
put the observance rate at 95%.35 7-a department may decline to accept
the Ombudsman's recommendation, as the police did in this instance. In
that event the only sanction available to the Ombudsman is to report the
matter to the Prime Minister and, ultimately, to the House of
Representatives. 8 '
Not content simply to decline to follow the recommendation, the police
went on the offensive and brought judicial review proceedings in the
High Court to have the Ombudsman's recommendation declared invalid.
In the Ombudsman case3 59 at first instance Mr. Justice Jeffries found
s60
the Chief Ombudsman to have committed several serious errors of law
and held that disclosure of witnesses' briefs of evidence in any circumstances would likely prejudice the investigation of offenses, the right to a

354. See FIFTH COMPENDIUM, supra note 350, at 17-18; Ombudsman, [1985] 1
N.Z.L.R. at 582. See also the arguments of the Solicitor-General on behalf of the police
quoted in Commissioner of Police v. Ombudsman, [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 392-93.
355. See FIFTH COMPENDIUM, supra note 350, at 21-25.
356. 1982 N.Z. Stat. No. 156, § 35(4).
357. Ombudsman, [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 409, (Casey, J.) (quoting W.D.
Baragwanath Q.C.).
358. Ombudsmen Act 1975, N.Z. Stat. No. 9, § 22(4).
359. [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 578.
360. For a full discussion of this aspect of the case, see Taggart, supra note 281, at
5-10.
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fair trial, and, more generally, the maintenance of law. The judge reasoned that written briefs of evidence could not satisfactorily be isolated
from the police investigation itself, and their disclosure would uncover to
a great extent the background investigatory and detection processes, and
thereby likely prejudice investigation of crime. 81 Moreover, Mr. Justice
Jeffries held that disclosure would prejudice the right to a fair trial by
making possible the coercion and intimidation of police witnesses and
discouraging some people from assisting the police, as well as by excluding the court from the discovery process and thereby weakening the
judge's control over the adjudicative process. 2
The police argued before the Ombudsman and the courts that fair
trial means fair both to the prosecution and the defense and that, as the
disclosure recommended by the Ombudsman lacked reciprocity, it was
plainly unfair. " ' The Chief Ombudsman had countered this objection
by referring to the practice of disclosure in criminal jury trials referred
to above. 6 ' While not referring to this exchange specifically, Mr. Justice
Jeffries rejected emphatically any equation of summary proceedings with
trials on indictment:
[T]his is a summary prosecution and [I] reject as unsound analogous argument that disclosure of briefs is akin to deposition hearings before trial on
indictment. I merely state ...[that] a brief of evidence ...[is] distinct
from deposition or statement, both signed, and available to all involved in
the trial, including the Court itself.3 5
The decision amounted to a blanket exclusion of briefs of evidence from
the reach of the OIA. The threshold of harm-defined as a distinct possibility of prejudice to the interests stated in section 6(c) 3 66-would be
crossed in every instance of attempted access under the OIA to this
material.
Pearce appealed this decision, but, through no fault of the court, it did
not come on for hearing for three years. In the interim the Criminal
Law Reform Committee's Report on Discovery in Criminal Cases6 7 ap-

361. [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 590.
362. Id. at 590-91.
363. Supra note 354 and accompanying text.
364. FIFTH COMPENDIUM, supra note 350, at 21.
365. [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 590. Later Mr. Justice Jeffries hinted acceptance of the
police reciprocity argument, referring to "the right to a fair trial summarily, which is
bilateral." Id. at 591. Cf Commissioner of Police v. Ombudsman, [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R.
385, 391 (Cooke, P.).
366. [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 589. See generally Taggart, supra note 281, at 8-9.
367. CRIMINAL LAW REFORM COMM., supra note 128. For a discussion of other
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peared. It is a substantial and compelling report proposing the enactment
of a comprehensive legislative code of criminal discovery applying to all
criminal cases, both summary and on indictment." 8'
The committee accepted unreservedly that the interests of justice require
accused persons to be fully informed of the case against them and of other
information relevant to their defence prior to trial. The traditional arguments against criminal discovery-perjury, witness tampering, and intimidation-while real concerns in some cases, did not justify the Common
be dealt with by exceptions to
Law approach of non-disclosure and could
69
3
a general statutory rule of disclosure.

The government appeared to be well disposed towards the proposals,
and implementation awaited a larger review of criminal law being conducted by the Department of Justice. 7 0
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeal heard the appeal and overturned the
decision at first instance, holding that the police should have made the
briefs of evidence available under the OIA. The five judges were unanimous that the briefs of evidence requested from the police were "personal information" to which the requester had a legal right under the
OIA and that section 6(c) did not justify withholding in this case.171 The
critical differences from the trial court's approach were that, whereas
Mr. Justice Jeffries had dismissed as "unsound" the analogy to the
practice of disclosure at trials on indictment and found briefs of evidence
to be inextricably intertwined with the investigative process, the majority
of the Court of Appeal (President Cooke and Mr. Justices Somers,
Casey, and Bisson) found the analogy compelling 7 2 and drew a sharp
distinction between investigation and commencement of criminal proceedings. 7' This laid the foundation for their holding that once summary criminal proceedings commence, advance disclosure of prosecution
evidence under the OIA similar to that in trials on indictment would not
be likely to prejudice investigation of offenses or the right to a fair trial
as a general rule. The judges allowed that exceptional cases would arise
in which a real risk of prejudice to the interests protected by section 6(c)
would arise, but these would be very much the exception and could be

developments in the interim, see Taggart, supra note 281, at 11-15.

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

Taggart, supra note 281, at 3-4.
Id. at 35-39.
See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
See e.g. [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. id. at 393.
Id. at 393-94 (Cooke, P.), 412 (Casey, J.), 415 (Bisson, J.).
Id. at 397 (Cooke, P.). See also id. at 415 (Bisson, J.).
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accommodated. 37 ' The fifth member of the court, Mr. Justice McMullin, was impressed by the analogy to disclosure in trials on indictment to
the extent that he agreed section 6(c) did not justify a blanket exclusion
of briefs of evidence in all summary prosecutions. 7 5 Nonetheless Mr.
Justice MeMullin expressed agreement "in principle with the approach
taken by Jeffries J." and placed more emphasis than the other judges on
the dianger of witness intimidation and coercion. 7 6 Mr. Justice McMullin stood alone in rejecting any rule of general application, preferring a
case-by-case approach to each request.8
In the circumstances of this
case the judge concurred in the result because the witnesses were police
officers and not likely to be intimidated. 7 8
The majority thought that before criminal charges are laid, investigations by the police will be protected from disclosure by section 6(c).3 79
But once criminal proceedings are commenced, the balance aimed at by
section 6(c) will usually shift in favor of disclosure. 8 At that point the
right to a fair trial prevails over the interest in investigative secrecy.88
President Cooke summed up the situation in this way:
[O]nce a case has progressed beyond the investigatory stage to the point
where criminal proceedings are actually under way, I think that the Act
gives the person who happens to be the defendant a prima facie right to
all the information held by the police which can truly be said to be personal information about that person and which contains or bears on the
evidence of the offence charged." 2
Furthermore, the majority found the practice of disclosure in trials on
indictment to be "so elementary and deep-rooted" that it could not imagine any serious suggestion that such disclosure could prejudice the investigation of offenses or the right to a fair trial. 83 Rather, it viewed such
disclosure as essential to a fair trial. 8 ' Even the judge most opposed to
liberalizing criminal discovery via the OIA, Mr. Justice McMullin, accepted that allowing "the defence in summary cases to see the police
briefs of evidence is . . .not likely to introduce a new terror into the
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. at 397-98, 400 (Cooke, P.), 412 (Casey, J.), 416 (Bisson, J.).
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id.
Id.

379. Id. at 397 (Cooke, P.).
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

412 (Casey, J.), 415 (Bisson, J.).
397.
394 (Cooke, P.).
412 (Casey, J.), 415 (Bisson, J.).
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administration of the criminal law."3 8 5

The majority found that none of the objections the police raised, either
singly or in combination, justified the general practice of withholding
briefs of evidence containing information about the accused in summary
proceedings.3 " 6 President Cooke said:
Briefs of the evidence to be called are no more likely to reveal investigation and detection methods in a damaging way than depositions. In deciding whether to come forward to help the police people are hardly likely to
be crucially influenced by whether or not the offence is indictable; it is a
legal distinction which might well not even occur to the ordinary citizen in
such circumstances. Certainly there might be less readiness to retreat from
a sworn deposition or even a signed police statement than from the contents of a brief which the witness may not even have seen, but it seems
difficult to place major weight on that difference. There will be opportunities for the defence to fabricate evidence or put pressure on witnesses in
both classes of proceedings, but in summary proceedings there will usually
be less time for such attempts to defeat justice. Disclosure of briefs in
summary cases may add somewhat to the administrative work of police
prosecutors and may also cause more care and time to be devoted to the
preparation of briefs, but those can hardly be viewed as unacceptable
evils.

38 7

Similarly, Mr. Justice Bisson dismissed the police concern that OIA disclosure would result in a more detailed and formal approach to preparing briefs of evidence, saying that if this means "the taking of greater
care

. . .

that is not prejudicial to but in the interests of a fair trial." ' 8

President Cooke delivered the leading opinion, with which Mr. Justice Somers simply agreed. 89 Mr. Justice Bisson wrote a short concur39 0
ring judgment in which he expressed agreement with President Cooke.
Together, these judgments represent the majority view of the court. Mr.
Justice Casey agreed with the majority in holding that disclosure would
be the general rule, but his judgment is more tentative in other respects
and is openly critical of the OIA as an instrument of criminal discovery. 91 This sets his judgment apart and places him somewhere between
the majority and Mr. Justice McMullin.
What distinguishes the majority's approach from that of Mr. Justices
385. Id. at 406.
386.

Id. at 393 (Cooke, P.).

387. Id. at 394.
388.

Id. at 416.

389. Id. at 387, 407.
390.

Id. at 414.

391.

Id. at 407.

294

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 23.235

Casey and McMullin is the zeal with which it wielded the OIA to fashion an entire system of criminal discovery. President Cooke laid down
general rules with a view to exhaustiveness much like legislation, covering material and proceedings not in dispute before the court. He held
briefs of evidence, witness statements, police job sheets, notes of interviews, and the like to be available upon request under the OIA both in
summary proceedings and in trials on indictment. 2 The President said
gaps, if any, in this scheme were to be filled by "judicial resource." '93
Along the way President Cooke made extensive reference to the report of
the Criminal Law Reform Committee, which had recommended legislation along broadly similar lines. Obviously emboldened by the work of
that Committee, President Cooke did not see the need for the court to
wait upon the legislature to reform the law of criminal procedure when
suitable tools were ready at hand.
In contrast, Mr. Justices McMullin and Casey did not think the OIA
a suitable mechanism for criminal discovery. They concluded reluctantly
that that was the effect of the clear wording of the OIA, "however unsuitable an instrument [of criminal discovery] it may be" and whatever
the "practical difficulties."39 ' To Mr. Justice Casey the OIA appeared
"an unwieldy instrument of pre-trial criminal discovery" and "a poor
substitute for rules of discovery properly developed for use in criminal
proceedings" as proposed by the Criminal Law Reform Committee.3 95
Mr. Justice McMullin also clearly preferred a legislative solution.39 6
The Criminal Law Reform Committee viewed criminal discovery as
serving the ends of the adversary process and held to the view that discovery should be governed by materiality and relevance to the central
issues at trial.3 9 The goal was to acquaint the accused with the prosecution's case, thereby avoiding surprise at trial and facilitating speedy resolution of the proceeding. As observed above, OIA access proceeds on a
fundamentally different premise.3 98 It provides for disclosure of information about the workings of government to the general public in order to
further democratic ideals, and for access by individuals to personal information to ensure fairness and information accountability. 99 Generally
speaking, a showing of need, reasonableness, or relevance is not re392. Id. at 396, 400.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

400.
407 (McMullin, J.).
413-14.
407.

supra note 128, at 16-23.
See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
See 1982 N.Z, Stat. No. 156, § 4 and long title.
CRIMINAL LAW REFORM COMM.,
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quired;40 0 consequently, "fishing" is no objection to an OIA request. °1
40
This troubled a minority on the Criminal Law Reform Committee,
and also Mr. Justice Casey in the Court of Appeal, who said:
It is ...by no means certain that widespread attempts to fish for information could be prevented, notwithstanding their generally oppressive or vexatious character. In civil actions, on the other hand, appropriate discovery
procedures have been developed by the Courts, enabling them to exercise
firm control over the exchange of all
relevant information designed to se403
cure a fair and expeditious trial.

Mr. Justice Casey was concerned also that the restriction of the legal
right of access under the OIA to "personal" information might deny the
requester access to information that he most needed to prepare for trial.
He instanced a sexual violation case in which under the OIA the accused
would have a right to the complainant's statement about him as personal
information but no right to see a medical report on the complainant. 40 '
Mr. Justice Casey gave this as a further reason for thinking the OIA an
unwieldly instrument for pre-trial criminal discovery.40 5
President Cooke and Mr. Justice Somers did not share that view.408
President Cooke concluded his opinion by suggesting that the legislature
stay its hand in implementing the Criminal Law Reform Committee's
proposals in order to give the OIA scheme of criminal discovery established by the court a chance to prove itself.40 7 He called the Law Reform
Committee proposals "elaborate" and presumed they "would . .. add
quite considerably to the administrative burden and cost falling on the
400. See SIXTH COMPENDIUM OF CASE NOTES OF THE OMBUDSMEN 82, 85 (1985)
(G.R. Laking, Chief Ombudsman); id. at 89, 93. Cf. 1982 N.Z. Stat. No. 156, §§ 9(l),
9(2)(k), 18(h), 27(1)(h), 28(1)(a). But see Ombudsmen Act 1975, 1975 N.Z. Stat. No. 9,
17(2)(a), (b) (trival or frivolous requests need not be pursued by Ombudsmen).
401. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
402. CRIMINAL LAW REFORM COMM., supra note 128, para. 150, at 30-31 (Mr.
Neazor, Q.C., Chief Inspector Trendle).
403. Commissioner of Police v. Ombudsman, [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385, 413. Unlike
the United States FOIA, however, the OIA does provide protection from vexatious requests. See 1982 N.Z. Stat. No. 156, §§ 18(h), 27(1) (h).
404. [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 413. See also id. at 396 (Cooke, P.).
405. Id. at 413.
406. The third member of the majority, Mr. Justice Bisson, was more cautious. He
said, "[u]ntil such time as discovery in criminal cases is expressly provided for in legislation, the provisions of the Official Information Act go some way in overcoming inconsistencies in current practice when applied in the manner described by the President, with
whose views 1 entirely agree." Id. at 415.
407. Id. at 400-01. The approaches of the Law Reform Committee and the Court
are compared in Taggart, supra note 281, at 18-24.
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police."'40° The President suggested that "a less sweeping change" by
application of the law he had laid down in this case might produce
"much the same result or go as far as is reasonable at the present
49
stage.'
The cautious approach of the courts in the United States and Australia described above highlights the boldness of the majority in Commissioner ofPolice v. Ombudsman. Counsel for the police cited to the Court
of Appeal two cases discussed above-NationalLabor Relations Board
v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.410 and News Corporation Ltd. v. National Co. and Securities Commission411-which contain dicta throwing
doubt on criminal discovery-motivated FOI requests. President Cooke
confined these cases to the context in which they arose, however, and did
not explore the dicta. 4 2 This is surprising because at another point President Cooke quoted a lengthy extract from the United States district
court decision in United States v. Wahlin41 3 to support a point he was
making. 4' 4 Ironically, Wahlin was almost certainly wrongly decided 4on5
its facts, and a United States appellate court has declined to follow it.
At another point, President Cooke referred to the "widespread international trend" towards greater freedom of information, but rather than
look at the law in the United States and Australia on the topic, he quizzically referred only to liberalization of criminal discovery by specific
legislation in England, a country that does not have general FOI legislation.416 All of this shows perhaps that poor and selective comparativism
is worse than none at all, as Mr. Justice McMullin espoused. Referring
expressly to Australia, Mr. Justice McMullin thought cases from other
FOI legislation jurisdictions offered little help. The judge gave three reasons for this: the statutes are differently worded; the Committee that had
proposed the New Zealand legislation considered the matter with special
reference to the New Zealand situation; and the overseas legislation may
408. Id. at 401. For critical comment on this aspect of the decision, see Taggart,
supra note 281, at 20.
409. [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 401.
410. 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). Discussed supra notes 86-102 and accompanying
text.
411. 57 A.L.R. 550 (Fed. Ct. 1984). Discussed supra at notes 235-62 and accompanying text.
412. [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 398.
413.

384 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Wis. 1974).

414. [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 399.
415. See supra notes 47, 51 and accompanying text. United States v. District Court,
717 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1983).
416. [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 397.
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be influenced by local conditions.4 1 But one of the purposes of comparative study is to gain perspective in critically appraising developments in
one's own legal system.""' A study of the United States, Canadian, and
Australian experience would have been particularly useful to Mr. Justice McMullin, who opposed the judicial legislation of the majority.
VI. CONCLUSION

New Zealand has the advantage in matters of law reform-be it legislative, judicial, or, as in this instance, a little of both-of being a small,
unitary state in which "experiments" can be carried out in more or less
controlled conditions."1 9 It is not blessed with or cursed by, depending on
one's point of view, the diversity of federalism and all it entails. Being
remote "tight" islands at the bottom of the world with one police force
obviously made it easier for the New Zealand Court of Appeals to proceed on the assumption that a police investigation will be complete or
nearly so by the time charges are laid, than it would be in a country of
many jurisdictions and police forces. 20 Moreover, one should not assume
that the preliminary hearing in the United States operates as effectively
as a disclosure mechanism as it does in New Zealand. 2 1
In addition, one must consider the differences between the legislation,
criminal justice systems, and societies in the four countries surveyed
here. What, for instance, explains the law enforcement mindedness of
much of the Canadian FOI legislation? But even when the wording of
the legislation leaves open an approach similar to that in Commissioner
of Police v. Ombudsman, as the United States and Australian legislation
does, the temper of the judiciary varies in each state. The New Zealand
court is in the midst of an activist period,4 22 in contrast to the generally
more restrained Australian judiciary. 2" As we have seen, judges in the

Id. at 402.
418. See Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure:A Pleafor Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 361, 362 (1977).
417.

419. See Reynolds, Contractual Mistakes Bill 1977, 1977 N.Z.
240, (Making a similar point in a different context.)

RECENT

L. 239,

420. See Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery in England, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 749, 770 (1964).
421. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1183; D. KARLEN, G. SAwER & E.M. WISE,
ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 143-166 (1967).
422. Much of this activism springs from Sir Robin Cooke, President of the Court of
Appeal. For camera shots of his legal philosophy, see Cooke, Divergences-England,
Australia and New Zealand, 1983 N.Z.L.J. 297; Cooke, Fundamentals,1988 N.Z.L.J.
158.
423. It is difficult to prove that this is so, but compare the approaches of Sir Robin
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United States and Australia do not share the New Zealand judiciary's
enthusiasm for the task of modeling a scheme of criminal discovery out
of FOI clay. Moreover, one should not underestimate the impact of the
Criminal Law Reform Committee's report on the reasoning and result in
the New Zealand case, nor the fact that nothing in New Zealand, Canada, or Australia then approximated the partial code of discovery provided in the United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. By
comparison those jurisdictions are, or were in the case of New Zealand,
in the "Neanderthal" stage of development.' 24
In recent years there has been much soul-searching about the purposes
and utility of comparative law."2" This Article's purpose has been to survey the impact of FOI legislation on criminal discovery in four countries
that share the common law tradition. As the long-time Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of California, Roger Traynor, observed when comparing criminal discovery in the United States and England in the mid1960s:
Such differences do more than elucidate the stuff of comparative law.
They also serve to remind us, in any advance upon its dusky areas, how
apt are the uses of diversity. It is no flat world, this world of law, and we
28
need many views as we envisage how much of it still awaits discovery.

Cooke and Sir Gerard Brennan toward administrative law. Compare Cooke, The Struggle for Simplicitly in Administrative Law, in JUDICIAL REVIEW or ADMINISTRATIVE
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